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Chapter 1  
1.1 Introduction to Thesis  
During the past decade, Investor-State Disputes Settlement (hereafter ISDS) in the World 
Banks’ arbitration facilities in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(hereafter ICSID), established under the ICISD Convention1 in 1966, have emerged to host 
the majority of investor-State arbitrations globally.2 In 2002 Argentina was hit by a severe 
financial crisis that triggered the largest number of investor-State claims taken to the ICISD 
directed at a single state in the history of investment treaties.3 The vast majority of the 61 
cases (claims)4 came from foreign investors in the public utilities sector, mainly gas, 
electricity and water.5 The conclusion and publication of the first disputes have been 
identified by several scholars6  as the beginning of the ‘legitimacy crisis’ in international 
investment law and arbitration, which has subsequently become the alleged ‘backlash against 
international law and arbitration.7 This thesis will undertake a literature review and a case law 
analysis of three main cases that were brought by foreign investors in privatized water 
concessions in Buenos Aires. These claims were triggered by the emergency measures 
adopted by the Argentine government in response to the financial crisis. In all the cases 
Argentina argued in its defense its own obligations to safeguard the fundamental human right 
to safe drinking water for its citizens. Notwithstanding this significant argument, the 
Tribunals found that Argentina had frustrated the investors legitimate expectations amounting 
to a violation of Argentina’s obligation under the bilateral investment treaty to guarantee Fair 
and Equitable Treatment (FET) to the investor. The denial of FET is the most frequently 
                                                        
1 ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States amd Nationals of Other States  
2  Special Update On Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures,2017, UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2017/7, 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (11 March 2018), at 5, Figure 7 (The cumulative 
number of publicly known investor-State cases is 817 cases of which 60 percent (approx.. 500) have been filed 
under the ICISD Convention and its Additional Facility Rules, as of July 2017) 
3 Jose E. Alvarez, "Lessons from the Argentina Crisis Cases," in The Public International Law Regime 
Governming International Investment The Pocket Book of the Hague Academy of International Law (Leiden 
BRILL, 2011). P. 248  
4 Special Update On Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures  (2017)  P. 3 (out of known cases 
against Argentina between 1987 – July 2017).  
5 "Lessons from the Argentina Crisis Cases." p. 249  
6 Ibid., 256.; William W. Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, "Private litigation in a public law sphere: the 
standard of review in investor-state arbitrations," The Yale Journal of International Law 35, no. 2 (2010): 289; 
Stephan W. Schill, "W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment 
Law," European Journal of International Law 22, no. 3 (2011): 895. 
7 E.g. Michael Waibel, The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (2010) 
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invoked claim by investors and the most successful claim on their behalf. One of its main 
functions is to restrict the government’s policy space. In contrast, one of the main obligations 
of States in the relation realization of the human right to water is to regulate.  
 
 
1.2. Subject matter in the wider context: Public Goods and Policy Concerns in a Globalized 
World  
 
We are all co-owners of the resources on earth, which demands justified arrangements on  
how and by whom these resources should be distributed  
-Mathias Risse 8    
 
The national and international regulation and good governance of under-supplied ‘public 
goods’ is said to be one of our times most challenging policy tasks.9 In an increasingly 
globally regulated economic world the key designers-, and developers of rule-making 
governing public goods are international institutions, businesses and State governments.10 The 
widespread, yet unnecessary poverty, hunger and health problems among billions of people 
globally bears witness of the acute need for institutional and legal safeguards to hold these 
actors legally and democratically accountable and to ensure ‘distributive justice’ of basic 
collective resources, such as access to food and medicine.11 Only 3% of the worlds water 
resources are fresh and more than 663 million people still lack access to safe drinking water.12 
The biggest challenge for distributive justice of water as a basic collective resource is 
financial constraints, pollution, increased desertification and depletion of groundwater 
resources by private profiteers. Today, there are no effective control by national parliaments, 
courts or civil society over the regulatory power exercised by most worldwide economic 
organizations.13 The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) form the most influential rule-makers constituting the 
                                                        
8 Mathias Risse, On global justice, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012).  
9 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International economic law in the 21st century : constitutional pluralism and 
multilevel governance of interdependent public goods, ed. Seies  (Oxford: Hart, 2012), 25. 
10 E.g. the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization. Risse, On global 
justice. 95.; Petersmann, International economic law in the 21st century : constitutional pluralism and multilevel 
governance of interdependent public goods, 27. 
11 Risse, On global justice. 95.; Petersmann, International economic law in the 21st century : constitutional 
pluralism and multilevel governance of interdependent public goods, 27. 
12 United Nations General Assembly The human rights to drinking water and sanitation, 17 December 2015, 
A/RES/70/169, p. 3 
13 International economic law in the 21st century : constitutional pluralism and multilevel governance of 
interdependent public goods, 27. 
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international economic order.14 The continued liberalization of economic regulation on the 
basis of economic agreements mostly without references to human rights nor human rights 
obligations, despite repeated global and national financial crisis’, environmental crisis and 
underdevelopment in signatory States confirm that the current order does not effectively 
protect human rights.15  
In 2002 Argentina went into the worst financial crisis in its history. More than 14 
million people were forced below the poverty line.16 Economic liberalization policies, 
promoted in the spirit of economic development and international co-operation, played an 
essential role in causing the crisis. The liberalization policies had been recommended by the 
IMF.17 Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel prize-winning economist, states that “the IMF led a whole 
series of mistakes, from exchange rate policy, to fiscal policy, to the privatizations, that 
culminated in disaster in Argentina.” 18 Privatized public utilities were some of the hardest hit 
‘markets’. An extensive study published by the World Bank on the success of the 
privatization of water utilities in Latin America ascribed the failure of many concessions to 
the “rather bullshit nature of the market in the 1990s” which led to “overoptimistic offers” by 
private operators leading to “contracts whose design was not viable”.19 In 2015 another 
liberalization era began in the country seeking foreign investments in untapped mining 
reserves.20  Yet, foreign investors have expressed reluctance to invest due to unclear 
environmental and export tax regulations representing a ‘business risk’. 21 In April 2018 
Argentina was facing another financial crisis seeing extreme inflation and poverty on the rise. 
The country is yet again resorting to the IMF, a move that is being protested by civil society.22 
The protective investment regime that has been set up in many developing countries are 
                                                        
14 Risse, On global justice. 15. 
15 Petersmann, International economic law in the 21st century : constitutional pluralism and multilevel 
governance of interdependent public goods, 29. 
16 Raymond Ker, "Argentina and the IMF:,"  https://www.mediamonitors.net/perspectives/argentina-and-the-
imf/.  
17 See, e.g. "IMF, «Argentina – Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economc Politics, Technincal Memorandum of 
Understanding» ",  http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2001/arg/01/.IMF, (accessed 23 March 2018).  
18 "Argentina and the IMF:".  
19 Philippe Marin, Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in 
Developing Countries 
, ed. Seies, World Bank Publications (The World Bank 2009), 28. 
20 Julia Castilla, "Mining companies still reluctant to tap Argentina deposits,"  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-mining/mining-companies-still-reluctant-to-tap-argentina-deposits-
idUSKCN1IO1IM.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Frederico Rivas Molina and Mar Centenera, "Why Argentina’s request for an IMF loan is bringing back bad 
memories," https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/05/09/inenglish/1525875218_515281.html, 
https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/05/09/inenglish/1525875218_515281.html.Why Argentina’s request for an IMF 
loan is bringing back bad memories https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/05/09/inenglish/1525875218_515281.html 
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increasingly perceived as one of the biggest threats to human rights enhancement and 
protection. This has been one of the effects of the one-sided focus on investors rights and 
privileges under investment treaties. UN experts are concerned that the treaties have a 
retrogressive effect on human rights protection and might even aggravate extreme poverty, 
and that experiences from investor-state arbitration “demonstrates that the regulatory function 
of many States and their ability to legislate in the public interest have been put at risk” due to 
the “’chilling effect’ that intrusive ISDS [Investor-State Dispute Settlement] awards have had, 
when States have been penalized for adopting regulations, for example to protect the 
environment”.23 
The evolving nature of the corporate social responsibility and the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights have emerged with the realization of the 
accountability gap that transnational corporations and foreign investors still enjoy today. The 
non-legally binding nature of these instruments is a reflection of the regulatory challenges in 
international law. This is due to the State-centered nature of international public affairs and 
the various specialized ‘self-contained’ legal regimes that have developed in the shadows as 
non-subjects in international law, which accommodate transnational relationships between 
other legal subjects in an increasingly globalized world.  
The various ‘specialized’ functions of law in the different ‘self-contained’-regimes of 
international economic institutions, courts and tribunals demonstrates the risks related to the 
absence of international coherence in justifications for the application of principles that 
distribute the common public goods  in a justified way.24  For instance, it is not hard to 
imagine that the international investment institutions’ corrective function emphasizes on 
‘reciprocal justice’ can conflict with the ideals of the international human rights institutions of 
‘constitutional’, ‘distributive justice’ and sustainable development based on the principles of 
‘universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’.25  
How then, should the international investment regime respond to the UNs concern that several 
of the protection standards in investment treaties are likely to have damaging effects on the 
                                                        
23 "UN experts voice concern over adverse impact of free trade and investment agreements on human rights," 
OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/FR/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16031&LangID=E. 
24 Risse, On global justice. 21. 
25 United Nations Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 23 May 1969, Unitied Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
1155 p. 331, (Preamble) (my italics); United Nations, Charter of the United Nations 24 October 1945, 1 UNITS 
XVI, (Preamble) 
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promotion and protection of human rights in a host State? Through by raising the bar for 
protection of public interests?26  
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)27 (hereafter the VCLT) confirms 
and requires constitutional interpretation of ‘disputes concerning treaties’ ‘in conformity with 
the principles of justice and international law’ including ‘principles of international law 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’ such as ‘universal respect for, and observance 
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’ (Preamble).28 Hence, international 
investment treaties and disputes settlement mechanism legally could, and arguably should, 
remain consistent with universal human rights obligations of UN member States and their 
democratic constitutional delimitations.  
However, the normative dimensions deriving from the aims and objectives of 
investment law are often perceived as a competition between private and public law 
perspectives. This is due to its public-private hybrid foundations and functions, as has been 
subject in extensive scholarly analysis.29 This ‘culture crash’, which is particularly evidenced 
by the high degree of inconsistencies in arbitral decisions30 and divergence in the legal 
doctrine bear witness of fundamental constitutional uncertainties as to the legal regimes view 
on the role of law, the role of the State, methodological approaches, and the true function of 
investment arbitration.31 Consequently, the concern related to arbitrators inadequate 
consideration for non-investment public concerns at stake in disputes is perhaps a mere 
reflection of the ‘specialized disciplines’ unclear relationship with the larger body of public 
international law where membership entails ‘constitutional’ delimitations anchored in the UN 
Charter32, the Vienna Convention Preamble and being true to the codified rules on treaty 
interpretation.  
This paper is a contribution to discourse arguing that human rights and constitutional 
democracy call for ‘civilizing’ and ‘constitutionalizing’ international economic law and 
                                                        
26 ’UN experts voice concern over adverse impact of free trade and investment agreements on human rights’ 
http://www.ohchr.org/FR/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16031&LangID=E  
27 Vienna Convention (23 May, 1969),  
28 Ibid., Preamble paras. 5 and 6 and Art. 2(1)(a) defining a "treaty" as an "international agreement concluded 
between States in written form and goverened by international law". . 
29 E.g. Stephan W. Schill, "Cross-Regime Harmonization through Proportionality Analysis: The Case of 
International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity and Human Rights," ICSID Review 27, no. 1 (2012); 
Burke-White and von Staden, "Private litigation in a public law sphere: the standard of review in investor-state 
arbitrations." 
30 Including dissenting opinions and annulments. See also: Ole Kristian Fauchald, "The Legal Reasoning of 
ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis," European Journal of International Law 19, no. 2 (2008). 
31 Stephan W. Schill, "W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment 
Law," ibid.22, no. 3 (2011): 888. 
32 Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945), Preamble and Art. 103 
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cooperation so that it can be an instrument for promoting our common interests in conformity 
with human rights obligations of all UN member states.33 
 
1.3 Subject matter in a narrower context: Realization or non-realization of the right to 
water through economic co-operation  
 
The interplay between the right to water and international investment law assumes key role in 
the realization or non-realization of access to safe drinking water because privatization of 
water utilities is perceived both as paramount to the realization of the right to water, and as its 
ultimate competitor.34 The ICESCR Art. 11(1) sets out that for the realization of the right to 
an adequate standard of living, of which a right to water is part, an appropriate step to ensure 
realization is through recognizing ‘the essential importance of international co-operation’.35 
Indeed, it is well established under international law that joint action and assistance for the 
achievement of  development and the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, is an 
important condition for such fulfilment.36   
 
In the 1980s the Argentine Government decentralized the responsibility of water utilities to 
the provincial, and municipal level. 37 Massive reductions in investment and funding from the 
federal budget, and no alternative adequate solution, had devastating consequences for 
maintenance, service quality and infrastructure expansions.38 The timely, regional economic 
liberalization, strongly encouraged by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
introduced private sector participation in urban water utilities as a solution to accommodate 
the need for technical capacity and large scale investments in infrastructure services. 39  In 
1991, Argentina became the first country in the ‘developing world’ to enter a Public-Private 
                                                        
33 Petersmann, International economic law in the 21st century : constitutional pluralism and multilevel 
governance of interdependent public goods, 4. 
34 Pierre Thielbörger, The Right(s) to Water : The Multi-Level Governance of a Unique Human Right, (Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2014). 3. NEED TO FIND SOURCE FOR THE THRID LARGEST 
FACT 
35 UN General Assembly, International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 16 December 1966, 
para. 11(11) second sentence ; UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General 
Comment No. 15 (2002): The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), 20 January 2003  
36 Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945), Art. 56 and 55; UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR),, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, 
of the Covenant), 14 December 1990, E/1991/23, para. 14 






Partnership in the water service sector when it awarded a concession to a private British 
consortium.40 This was later followed by several ambitious concessions for water utilities in a 
number of provinces, among them in the capital of the Greater Buenos Aires in 1993.41 In 
order to attract private- and particularly foreign investments to water concessions, the 
Argentine federal and provincial authorities had undertaken a number of national and local 
legislative changes favorable to private interests. In the same spirit the country singed a 
number of bilateral investment treaties providing international protection for investments 
made by nationals of the contracting States and enacted the ICSID Convention in October 
1994.42 Foreign-owned companies came to be awarded the majority of concession contracts 
for the water and sewage deliveries. In 2002 approximately 18 million people, more than half 
of the urban population, was served water by foreign-owned private corporations, making it 
the largest privately financed water market in the developing world. 43 Nearly all the private 
financing came from five large transnational companies and international institutions/banks.44  
State parties to bilateral investment treaties have committed to ascertain certain standards of 
protection for foreign investors operating within its territory. At the same time, the State have 
international obligation to protect human rights. These simultaneous obligations can come 
into tension.  
 
The 2002 UN General Comment No. 15 stresses the duty of States to ensure that international 
agreements or lending conditions in financial institutions do not adversely impact upon the 
right to water or ‘curtail or inhibit a countries capacity to ensure the full realization of the 
right to water’.45 A failure of a State to take into account its obligations to the human right to 
water when entering agreements with States or international organization can amount to a 
violation to respect the right to water.46 However, most international investment law 
establishing-documents and regulatory treaties, such as the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States47 (hereafter ICISD 
Convention) and most of the roughly 3000 bilateral investment treaties (hereafter BITs) 
                                                        
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 ICSID, "Argentina and Nicaragua Ratify the ICSID Convention," NEWS FROM ICSID 1995. 
43 Marin, Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in Developing 
Countries 
, 22-23. 
44 Ibid., 23. 
45 CESR, General Comment No. 15 (2002), para. 35 and 36 
46 Ibid., para. 44(c)(vii). 
47 ICSID Convention (opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966),  
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globally do not (yet) have textual references to ‘justice’, human rights, democratic governance 
or rule of law.48 Such was the case for the BITs entered into by Argentine in the 1990s, of 
which most are still in force today. 
   
In the 2002 financial crisis, Argentina undertook a number of nation-wide emergency 
regulatory measures in response to the financial crisis. In the years following many water 
concessions were prematurely terminated and reversed back to public ownership. The 
terminations were in most cases due to violations of the concession contract by one or both 
parties, or difficulties adapting the concession contracts over time to the changing social, 
political, economic and legislative conditions, particularly during and after the financial 
crisis.49 The emergency measures triggered the largest number of investor-State claims taken 
to the ICISD directed at a single state in the history of investment treaties.50 The vast majority 
of the 61 cases51 came from foreign investors in the public utilities sector, mainly gas, 
electricity and water.52 The regulatory changes  was the essence in the vast majority of 
investor claims brought under the ICSID Convention and relevant BITs related to privatized 
utilities, and thus an investor-grievance far beyond the issue of termination of the concession 
contract. Particularly disputed was Argentines denial of the request by the concessionaries for 
substantial increases in tariffs during the crisis. According to human rights law the obligation 
to protect requires the State to prevent third parties from compromising “equal, affordable, 
and physical access” to water by “adopting the necessary and effective legislative and other 
measures to restrain[…]third parties from denying equal access to adequate water.”53  
 
However, in many of these disputes Argentina has been found liable, particularly under the 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard.  
                                                        
48 Petersmann, International economic law in the 21st century : constitutional pluralism and multilevel 
governance of interdependent public goods, 323.; Although we are starting to see reference to human rights and 
states regulatory rights in some newer Model BITs. See e.g Norwegian Model BIT, May 2015,Draft version 
130515, https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/e47326b61f424d4c9c3d470896492623/draft-model-
agreement-english.pdf . ( Preamble, Articles 6, 8(2), 11(1), 12, 23viii, and 31: reflect a direction away from a 
sole focus on investment protection by emphasizing the state’s ability to regulate for the protection of health, 
human rights, safety, and environmental issues). 
49 Marin, Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in Developing 
Countries 
, 28. 
50 Alvarez, "Lessons from the Argentina Crisis Cases," 248.  
51 Special Update On Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures  (2017) 3  P. 3 (out of known cases 
against Argentina between 1987 – July 2017).  
52 "Lessons from the Argentina Crisis Cases," 249.  
53 CESR, General Comment No. 15 (2002), para. 23 
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In 2007 the UN Commissioner for Human Rights highlighted submissions of concern in her 
review of the right to water “regarding the relationship between the obligations of States 
under bilateral investment treaties and their human rights obligations in relation to access to 
safe drinking water” due to the potential impact BIT obligations can have on “the duty of 
States to regulate companies”.54 The concern was also related to two ongoing proceedings 
against Argentina in ISDS, and the uncertainty over “whether and how the obligations of 
Governments under international human rights instruments will be taken into account in 
ICSID judgements”.55  
 
The 2002 General Comment No. 5 on the right to water suggest that States should encourage 
‘judges, adjudicators or any member of the legal profession’ to pay greater attention to 
violations of the right to water in the exercise of their functions.56 Indeed in the majority of 
the lawsuits filed against Argentina by investors in water utilities Argentines main, and 
perhaps only, argument of defence was its human right to water obligations. The emerging 
body of ICSID case law has made arbitrators, and not necessarily the inter-State treaty-
making process, the most important actor in developing the field of investment law.57 What 
role does adjudicators who are deciding disputes over privatized water utilities in a private-
party investment arbitration play in the advancement of the universal right to access safe 
drinking water? The question of whether and how Argentines obligations to the human right 




1.4 Research Question(s) & Method  
 
Can the system of investment law can undermine the human right to water? 
 
                                                        
54 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the scope and content of the relevant 
human rights obligations related to equitable access to safe drinking water and sanitation under international 
human rights instruments,16 August 2007 A/HRC/6/3, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/water/iexpert/docs/A-CHR-6-3_August07.pdf (4 April 2018), para. 52-53 
and 63-64 
55 Ibid. (referring to ICISD proceedings ARB/03/17 and ARB/03/19) 
56 CESR, General Comment No. 15 (2002), para. 58 
57 Schill, "W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law," 880. 
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a) Can foreign investors in privatized water utilities ‘legitimately expect’ regulatory 
stability that undermines the regulatory duty of the host State to safeguard basic access 
to water for its population in times of crisis? 
 
b) Do the arbitration Tribunals in investor-State arbitration accord legal impact to their 
recognition of Argentine obligation to the human right to water in disputes over public 
water utilities in Argentina (Buenos Aires)? 
 
To explore these questions the methodological approach undertaken is twofold and divided 
into two different analysis’ where the former informs the latter. For technical purposes, the 
thesis is divided into two parts.    
 
Part I 
The first analysis undertakes a descriptive literature review of the fragmentation discourse in 
international investment law and arbitration with the focus of identifying where the 
investment system is in tension with the ideals deriving from international human rights law. 
The analysis reviews literature on international investment law form both private and public 
law scholars in the field but has a presumption for the international public law function of the 
private law system of international investment law and arbitration. The literature review is 
complemented by case law, positive legal sources, constitutional documents and relevant UN 
instruments on the topic of foreign investment and water privatization.  
 
The aim is to identify concerns raised in relation to if and how the system and function of 
investment law can undermine the realization of the human right to water by looking at 
procedural, substantive and rule of law parameters from the perspective of human rights 
justifications. Of particular focus is the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard(s) (FET) 
enshrined in most Bilateral Investment Treaties.  
 
Part. II 
The second analysis is a case law study58 of three investor-State awards by the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes rendered against Argentina over privatized 
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water services. The main focus of the analysis was to identify how Tribunals interpret and 
apply open ended investor protection standards and the legal reasons behind the choices 
made.  
 
The aims of the case law analysis is to understand how the Tribunals give legal content to the 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard and how they accommodate arguments of legal tension 
with the human right to water. The analysis will take a functional and descriptive perspective 
for the purposes of identifying if the Tribunals responsibly bridge tensions between the States 
duty to accord FET to foreign investors, and its duty to progressively realize and guarantee 
the human right to water.  
 
In addition to these two analysis I will also establish the status of the human right to water in 
Argentina as a legal ‘tool’ for the purpose of ‘measuring’ the discrepancy between the 
interests at stake, and the interests addressed by Tribunals in the case law analysis in relation 
to the human right to water. 
 
The relationship between the analysis in Part I and Part II: Part I will identify the 
constitutional foundations of the international investment law regime that enables it to retain a 
harmonious relationship with international human rights law, and the structures that indicate 
tension identified in the literature. The key concerns identified determines the approach to the 
case law analysis in Part II. The findings from the case law analysis will then be discussed in 
light of the concerns raised in the literature.  
 
Key findings 
                                                        
The question of conflicts of law and resolution is an area of tension in arbitration tribunals as 
raise key concerns related to the tension between the states duty to regulate and the limitations 
placed on the regulatory space when entering treaties. This, of course is just the same with 
any treaty but if the it seems little regard for the fact that human rights treaties are positive 





From the perspective of human right to water the ultimate indicators of tension is the demand 
for absolute regulatory stability, the lack of concern for facts, the no concern for factual 
circumstances, the lack of concern for intent and isolated focus on effect on the investor, the 
uncertainty around inconsistent case law, States ability to contract away jurisdiction over key 
resources, lack of transparency and participation. 
 
1.5 Limitations  
The area of international investment law and international human rights law is broad in scope 
and encompasses interaction between legal sources and transboundary legal relationship from 
an incomprehensible number of legal sources, principles and possible conflicts of interest. 
The legal sphere of international investment law is currently undergoing reforms. It has been 
a challenge to navigate in the legal “doctrine” with such high degrees of uncertainties at every 
level. The methodological approach is chosen thereafter and has its legal limitations.  
 
 
1.6 Structure of thesis  
 
Part I: consists of three chapters undertaking a descriptive literature review. Chapter 2 
established the existence of an internationally recognized human right to water as an 
introduction to Part I. The rest of Chapter 2 deals with the formal procedures and structures of 
investment arbitration facilities, and its possible implications for adjudicating over water 
utilities’. Chapter 3 looks at the applicable law in disputes with particular focus on concerns 
over the role played or not played by non-investment law. Chapter 4 looks closely at the fair 
and equitable treatment standard for the purposes of identifying the elements of possible 
tension and threat or opportunity to progressively make bridges between different legal 
spheres  
 
Part II: consists of six chapters with focus on the case law analysis. Chapter 5 established the 
status of a national and international human right to water in Argentina and if this right 
hypothetically can be used in ICSID proceedings. Chapter 6. Looks at the human right 
Tribunals response to the human rights arguments advanced by Argentina. It also looks at the 
human rights implications identified in the decisions in three key topics: investor misconduct, 
regulatory framework and alternative measures. Chapters 7-9 looks at how the Tribunals dealt 
with the fair and equitable treatment standard in the cases. Chapter 10 makes a analysis of the 
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three cases interpretation and application of the FET standard. Chapter 11 gives a short 
summary and conclusion of my thesis.  
 
 
 Literature Review  
PART I 
Chapter 2. Investor-State Arbitration – Governing our Goods and 
Governments?  
 
“We the people of the United Nations determined[…]to establish conditions under which 
justice and respect or the obligation arising from treaties and other source of international 
law can be maintained[…]and to these ends[..]to employ international machinery for the 
promotion of the economic and social development of all peoples.” 




2.1 Introduction Part I 
In 2010 the UN General Assembly passed the historic Resolution 64/292 that explicitly 
‘recognizes the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is 
essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights’.59 The Resolution represented 
long awaited consensus in the international community60 that is said to have established, once 
and for all, the human right to water as an independent human right deriving from several 
human rights found in internationally binding treaties.  
 
The Resolution ‘recalled’ various general and specific human rights conventions, UN 
Resolutions and General Comments from UN expert bodies on the right to water, and 
specifically recalled the report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the ‘scope 
and content of the relevant human rights obligations related to equitable access to safe 
                                                        
59 UN General Assembly, The human right to water and sanitation : resolution / adopted by the General 
Assembly, 3 August 2010 A/RES/64/292, Art. 1 
60  General Assembly Adopts Resolution Recognizing Access to Clean Water, Sanitation as Human Right, by 
Recorded Vote of 122 in Favour, None against, 41 Abstentions, 28 July 2010, 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2010/ga10967.doc.htm, 21 May 2018 
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drinking water and sanitation under international human rights instruments.’61 Of particular 
significance was the 2002 General Comment No. 1562 (hereafter GC15) which established a 
thorough legal basis for the right to water under the ICESCR Art. 11(1) and art. 12.63 GC15 
established that ‘everyone’ under the right to health and the right to adequate standard of 
living  has a right to ‘sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water’ 
and set out a norm prioritizing the allocation of water  “for personal and domestic uses” and 
“to prevent starvation and disease”.64 The report identifies a rich base of instruments referring 
implicitly or explicitly to the right to safe drinking water.65 Of particular significance was the 
2002 General Comment No. 1566 (hereafter GC15) which established a thorough legal basis 
for the right to water under the ICESCR Art. 11(1) and art. 12.67 GC15 established that 
‘everyone’ under the right to health and the right to adequate standard of living  has a right to 
‘sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water’ and set out a norm 
prioritizing the allocation of water  “for personal and domestic uses” and “to prevent 
starvation and disease”.68  
The Hight Commissioners report further emphasized that “while human rights treaties do not 
recognize access to safe drinking water and sanitation per se, specific obligations to access to 
safe drinking water and sanitation have been increasingly and explicitly recognized in core 
human rights treaties, mainly the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to 
health.” 69  
 
Later on in 2010 the Human Rights Council passed resolution 15/9 which ‘recalled’ 
Resolution 64/292 and ‘affirmed’ that “human right to safe drinking water and sanitation is 
derived from the right to an adequate standard of living and inextricably related to the right to 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”70  
 
                                                        
61 A/RES/64/292, 2 
62 CESR, General Comment No. 15 (2002),   
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., para. 6. 
65 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on the scope and content of the relevant human rights obligations related to equitable access to 
safe drinking water and sanitation under international human rights instruments, 16 August 2007, A/HRC/6/3, 
para. 5 (b)1 
66 CESR, General Comment No. 15 (2002),   
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., para. 6. 
69 Ibid., para. 6. 
70 Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, 30 September 2010 
A/HRC/RES/15/9, Art. 2 and Art. 3 
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In 2015 the General Assembly adopted by consensus Resolution 70/169 which made a clearer 
distinction between the right to water and the right to sanitation, and affirms again that the 
right to safe drinking water is a part of the right to an adequate standard of living and the right 
to the highest attainable standard of health and “entitles everyone, without discrimination, to 
have access to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for 
personal and domestic uses.”71  
 
Foreign direct investment, investor-State arbitration and privatization of water services can 
impact on the enjoyment, realization and enforcement of the human right to water. By 
privatizing water supply water becomes a private economic good as well as remaining a basic 
collective resource which everyone depends and has a right to access.72 As much as foreign 
direct investment (FDI) can contribute to the urgent need for investment in infrastructure and 
technical competence, it can also cause overemphasis on commercial objectives and through a 
protective investment regime threaten the role of the Government as duty bearer to human 
rights by subverting regulatory systems.73 Nevertheless, the effectiveness and realization of 
the right to water largely depends on comprehensive regulation by the State to ensure non-
discrimination and affordability regardless of ability to pay.74 As such, the relationship 
between the States as a primary duty bearer to human rights, the populations non-derogable 
rights to access safe, sufficient and affordable drinking water, and the private suppliers right 
to a reasonable return and access to private, supranational adjudication, can pulverize 
responsibility and make accountability complex.75  
 
International investment law can affect national water resources and water provision and how 
it is managed, justiciable and regulated. Of concern here is how investment agreements and 
investment arbitration can curtail regulatory powers of governments over privatized public 
water services. When a foreign investor is operating the public water services, the public’s 
need for regulation can be curtailed because governmental regulations can be overruled by 
                                                        
71 A/RES/70/169, Art. 1 and 2 
72 CESR, General Comment No. 15 (2002), ; A/HRC/RES/15/9, ; Human Rights Council : resolution / adopted by 
the General Assembly, 3 April 2006 A/RES/60/251, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4537814814.html (2 April 
2018) 
73 UN Economic and Social Council, Liberalization of trade in services and human rights Report of the High 
Commissioner* Executive summary, 25 June 2002, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, p. 3 (c) 
74 Thielbörger, The Right(s) to Water : The Multi-Level Governance of a Unique Human Right. 3.  
75 Report of the independent expert on the issue of human 
rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and 
sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque 29 June 2010, A/HRC/15/31, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/water/iexpert/docs/A-HRC-15-31-AEV.pdf (4 April 2018), para. 16 
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international arbitration courts based on a frustration of the investors expectation for profit. 
The “legitimate expectations” of investors can give protection against governmental 
legislation that negatively impacts on the profit-making of investors in water utilities, 
regardless of the purpose behind the legislation.76 This can deter governments from 
regulating, intervening and improving regulatory frameworks for the fear of lawsuits.77 In the 
event of arbitration, the public, whose resources are under dispute, is by large precluded from 
participation and transparency.  
 
2.2 Introduction to Chapter 2   
Investor-State arbitration facilities undeniably enhance procedural protection of 
otherwise ‘vulnerable’ alien investors vis-à-vis Sovereign States, with the purpose of 
promoting mutual economic development in the signatory States to the ICISD Convention.78  
However, there are wide-reaching concerns that investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) in  
ad hoc tribunals under ICISD procedures constitutes an unaccountable form of global 
administrative governance. This is because it can leave little or nothing a Sovereign State 
does immune from private, supranational arbitral scrutiny, which additionally conducts its 
review in a manner that allegedly often leaves wide discrepancy between the interests at stake 
and the interests addressed by Tribunals.79  
 
Notably, the conclusion and publication of the first disputes against Argentina after the crisis 
have been identified by several scholars80 as the outset of the ‘legitimacy crisis’ in 
                                                        
76 Miguel Solanes and Andrei Jouravlev, Revisiting privatization, foreign investment, international arbitration, 
and water, ed. Seies  (2007), 11.  
77 Ibid., p. 11. 
78 ICSID Convention (opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966), (Preamble) 
79 Alvarez, "Lessons from the Argentina Crisis Cases," 257-258. (describing the critique as encompassing 
vertical, horizontal, ideological and rule of law concerns); Public Statement on the International Investment 
Regime – signed by 37 legal academics, (31 August, 2010), available at: https://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-
statement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010/, (accessed: 15 March 2018) (Academics from all 
over the world, most of them legal professors in law, expressed deep concern for the harm done to the public 
welfare by the international investment regime, especially “its hampering of ability of governments to act for 
their people in response to concerns of human development and environmental sustainability); Attila Tanzi, "On 
Balancing Foreign Investment Interests with Public Interests in Recent Arbitration Case Law in the Public 
Utilities Sector," The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 11, no. 1 (2012): 48. (footnote n10 
contains an extensive list of literature arguing that BITs and international investment arbitration has been to the 
detriment of the sovereign power and duty of host States to pursue the general interests of their populations) 
80 Alvarez, "Lessons from the Argentina Crisis Cases," 256.; Burke-White and von Staden, "Private litigation in 
a public law sphere: the standard of review in investor-state arbitrations," 289; Schill, "W(h)ither Fragmentation? 
On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law," 895. 
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international investment law and arbitration or the alleged ‘backlash against international law 
and arbitration’.81 ISDS is currently an area of legal uncertainty and political controversy.  
 
In what follows, I will give a breach introduction the Centre, identify its constitutional 
governing aims, and institutional structures in the investor-State dispute settlement regime 
under ICSID procedural rules that set the premises for the Centers jurisdiction. This will aid 
the understanding of the implications of investor-State disputes over public water services, 
and possible tension with the aims of realizing the human right to water.  
 
 
2.3 Constitutional Considerations of the ICSID  
 
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereafter ICSID) was 
established under the ICISD Convention82 in 1966. The arbitration facilities of the Centre 
provides a procedural mechanism that enables foreign investors to sue States directly in 
confidential, supranational, ad hoc Tribunals reviewing the legality of public acts of 
Governments, issuing unappealable and binding decisions on State liability directly 
enforceable in the host States.83 There are currently 153 contracting States to the ICSID 
Convention.84 
 
During the past decades, investor-State disputes settlement under ICSID procedures went 
from being a relatively rare phenomenon to becoming an important factor in transnational 
economic activity.85 Today the majority of investor-State arbitrations globally are submitted 
to the Centre’s jurisdiction for adjudication.86 Since the first ICSID case in 1972,87  about 
60% of lawsuits resolved under its jurisdiction has been filed under Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs), that is, arbitration clauses in BITs providing for dispute resolution under 
                                                        
81 See e.g. Michael Waibel, The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (2010) 
82 ICSID Convention (opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966),  
83 Christoph H. Schreuer et al., The ICSID Convention : A Commentary, ed. Seies, 2nd ed. ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). ix – xi (introductory note)  
84 "Database of ICSID Member States,"  https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-
States.aspx. 
85 Schill, "W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law," 879-
880. 
86  Special Update On Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures  (2017) at 5, Figure 7  (The 
cumulative number of publicly known investor-State cases is 817 cases of which 60 percent (approximately 500) 
have been filed under the ICISD Convention and its Additional Facility Rules, as of July 2017) 
87 Ibid., at 5, Figure 7   
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ICSID procedural rules which can be invoked by investors against States. The first BIT, as far 
as publicly known, was concluded between Germany and Pakistan in 1959.88 Today, there are 
no less than 3000 International Investment Agreements (IIAs) globally, including multilateral, 
regional and bilateral investment treaties.89  
 
ICISD was created under the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the 
World Bank). The World Bank is one of United Nations ‘Specialized Agencies’ established 
under the UN Charter Articles 57 and 63 with ‘wide international responsibilities, as defined 
in their basic instruments’.90 The governance document of the World Bank ‘Articles of 
Agreement’ sets out that the Bank ‘shall’ be guided in ‘all its decisions’ to ‘promote…growth 
of international trade…by encouraging international investment for the development of the 
productive resources of members, thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of 
living and conditions of labor in their territories’.91 Although the constitutional document do 
not refer to any human rights objects per se being an agency of the UN founded by State 
members, the overall purpose of the UN Charter should be part of its objective, particularly as 
it falls within the mandate of the Bank “to employ international machinery for the promotion 
of the economic and social development of all peoples.”92  
 
The object and purpose of the ICISD Convention was to “provide facilities for conciliation 
and arbitration of investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other 
Contracting States”93 thus a procedural instrument creating a safe investment climate 
stimulating larger flows of international private capital “considering the need for international 
cooperation for economic development”.94  State parties primary advantage in offering ICISD 
arbitration to investors is that it is likely to attract sought-for investments,95 and that it relieves 
and shields the State from the process of diplomatic protection.96  
 
                                                        
88 United Nations UNCTAD, "Investment Policy Hub: International Investment Treaty Navigator " 
(http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent#sectionContainer_1).Available at:  
89 Ibid. 
90 Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945), Art. 57(italics added)  
91 United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, IBRD Articles of Agreement 22 July 1944 (as amended 
17/12/65, 16/02/89 and 27/06/12), Art. 1(III) 
92 Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945), (Preamble) 
93 ICSID Convention (opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966),  Article 1 (2)  
94 Ibid. Preamble of ICISD Convention.  
95 Schreuer et al., The ICSID Convention : A Commentary, 8.  
96 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, ed. Seies  (Oxford: 
Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2014), 232.  
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Traditionally, alien investors relied on diplomatic protection from their home government for 
access to international justice from host State abuse. However, only after exhaustion of local 
remedies could the investor  The Report of the World Bank Executive Directors approving the 
ICSID Convention emphasises the “desire to strengthen the partnership between countries in 
the cause of economic development’, and characterises the creation of the ICSID institution as 
a “major step toward promoting an atmosphere of mutual confidence and thus simulating a 
larger flow of private international capital into those countries which wish to attract 
it.”97Concerning the interests of host States in light if the objective of providing investment 
protection the Report of the Executive on the Convention states that “the provisions of the 
Convention maintain a careful balance between the interests of investors and those of host 
States”,98 and that “the provisions of the Convention should be equally adapted to the 
requirements of both cases.” 99 The primary objective for the creation of the ICSID was thus 
to promote and encourage private, foreign investment to facilitate the more overreaching 
purpose of global economic development in the ‘developing world’. The way the ICSID 
Convention will accommodate this objective is by “offering a favourable climate for attractive 
and sound investments through neutral, binding, and efficient dispute resolution.”100 The 
statements can be said to somewhat underscore the importance of the balance inherent in the 
Convention by, again, emphasising the broader objective of providing favourable conditions 
for investors. Notwithstanding, of course, that the States will also benefit from benefitting the 
investor. By such, the positive objective to promote economic development in the developing 
world has more of an indirect character, as the arbitration mechanism is designed to mitigate 
negative impacts for the investor.   
 
2.4 Inescapable jurisdiction  
 
The ICISD Convention provides protected investors with direct access to international 
arbitration. The direct admissibility of claims entail that almost all investment disputes today 
are submitted to this non-transparent facility rather than other national or international 
                                                        
97 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report of the Executive Directors of the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Other States (March 18, 1965), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID_Conv%20Reg%20Rules_EN_2003.pdf (26 May 
2018), 41 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid., p. 41. 
100 Ibid., 40. 
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courts.101 The State ratifies the ICSID Convention102 and announces its consent in an 
investment treaty or agreement while the investor can give her consent to the ICSID 
jurisdiction directly by invoking a lawsuit. A foreign investor whose activity falls under the 
broadly interpreted definition of ‘investment’ under the ICISD Convention Article 25 can 
bring ‘any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment’103 to the Centre. The State often 
finds itself at the ultimate will of the investor as to the possibility of a dispute, as the State 
cannot invoke a claim given that the governing law if often one-sided in nature and focus 
primarily on investor protection. However, the State has a small window of possibilities to 
bring counterclaims against the investor if in on-going disputes. The 2016 Urbaser case 
brought some important jurisprudential developments as to clarifying the rules on the 
admissibility of such claims in relation to what can be regarded as an investors consent.104 
There are also some new developments in inter-State treaty making processes that propose 
BIT Models with obligations on investors.  
  
A State and investor can make agreements that a dispute shall first go through local courts 
before reaching ICSID.105 A State can in an agreement require full jurisdiction over any 
dispute arising out of an investment, such as water concession contracts. However, even in the 
event of such an agreement the investor, by the invocation of a Most-Favored-Nation clause 
(MFN) in an applicable BIT, can bypass national courts regardless of such agreement. This is 
because the MFN clause secures non-discrimination, with the effect of unifying investment 
protection across BITs as a State has committed not to treat any investors less favorably than 
another in his territory. Thus, the MFN clause enables investors to invoke more advantageous 
protection standards found in other BITs in the host State, such as agreements without 
requirements to resort to national courts.106 Setting this precedence was the Maffezini v 
Spain107 case where the tribunal found that a precondition to submit a dispute to a local court 
                                                        
101 Petersmann, International economic law in the 21st century : constitutional pluralism and multilevel 
governance of interdependent public goods, 281-282. 
102 There are some possibilities for non-parties to bring claims to the ICSID, see Additional Facility Rules  
103 ICSID Convention (opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966), Art. 25 
104 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. ARB07/26) Award (8 December 2016 ), para. 1148:  the investor is considered to have given 
consent to a counterclaim can be admissible as long as the dispute resolution clause refers to “any claim” and 
there is no reservations 
105 ICSID Convention (opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966), Art. 26 (Art. 
26 provides that “consent of the parties…shall…be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any 
other remedy”) 
106 Schill, "W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law," 893. 
107 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7) Award, (13 November 2000) 
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before commencing to the ICSID tribunal was a violation of the MFN standard because 
another BIT did not require such recourse.108 Since Maffezini, Tribunals have similarly held 
that MFN clauses can extend dispute resolution provisions to preclude first-resort 
requirements,109 also in the case of foreign shareholders in local companies.110 In the words of 
Thielbörger in regards to concession contracts in water utilities which gave national courts 
full jurisdiction over disputes: 
 
“it[Tribunal]has made its point clear that it will not accept States’ attempts to deprive the 
ICSID tribunals of their jurisdiction, by granting exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation 
of the concession contract to local courts”111 
 
With the close to 3000 BITs in the world, where a majority provides for MFN-clauses, it 
appears difficult for State to avoid the tribunals jurisdiction with an agreement that requires 
resort to local courts nor an agreement that explicitly precludes international arbitration by 
requiring disputes to be resolved nationally. A part of the right to water is access to 
information, justice, reparation and restitution.112 However, ICISDs broad scope can take 
disputes over water services away from the national jurisdiction. Due to the 
interconnectedness between investment and the realization of water the 2002 General 
Comment. No 15 from the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights specifically 
sets out that States have to make sure that the right to water is “given du attention in 
international agreements and[…]make sure that these instrument do not adversely impact 
upon the right to water.”113 
 
 
2.5 Arbitrators, Advocates – or in fact Transnational judges?  
 
The Tribunals under the ICSID Convention are ad hoc, and arbitrations are thus appointed by 
on a case by case basis. Tribunals usually consist of three arbitrations, and decisions are made 
by majority vote. As such the primary mandate of an arbitrator is to assist in dispute 
resolution in a specific party-driven case. Usually, one arbitrator is appointed by the Centre, 
                                                        
108 Jan Paulsson Lucy Reed, and Nigel Blackaby, Guide to ICSID Arbitration 2nd. Edition Revised ed. Seies, 
Second edition ed. (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 2011), 85.  
109 Ibid.  
110 Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17) Award (21 June 2011 ) 
111 Thielbörger, The Right(s) to Water : The Multi-Level Governance of a Unique Human Right. 156. 
112 CESR, General Comment No. 15 (2002), paras. 12 (c), 49 and 56 
113 Ibid., para. 35. 
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while the two others are party-appointed. This works to insure party autonomy and confidence 
in the process. It has traditionally been perceived as legitimate that parties to a private 
arbitration choose arbitrators with maximum predetermination for their interests, while of 
course, still maintaining independence in light of the checks and balanced that may lead to 
disqualification.114 The consequence is that arbitrators can have diverse backgrounds as they 
serve opposing interests and legal subjects. Lawyers and academics with backgrounds in 
public international law and commercial law are typical examples. They often have differing 
opinions and perspectives, and many are arbitrators and scholars in the field. Their different 
understandings of the role of the State, methodological approaches, the function of investment 
arbitration and knowledge of other international law areas contributes to making investment 
law an incoherent area of law.115 The somewhat dual role of being party-appointed and 
independent has been criticized for possibly compromising the independence of the decision-
making process due to the direct relationship that is established between the arbitrators and 
the parties.116 The opposing arguments of the disputing parties also seem to have a polarizing 
effect on decision-making evidenced though separate or dissenting opinions by arbitrators 
appointed by the losing party, as well as a doctrinal state of division between private and 
public law affiliation. This raises the question of whether arbitrators are incentivized to build 
responsible bridges between the interests of the opposing parties, and whether the polarization 
plays an essential part in the fragmentation of investment law from other public international 
law systems. Some call for a reform of the system and the creation of permanent judges, while 
others concur to the traditional principle of ‘party autonomy’ as it is regarded as a vital 
precondition for the parties’ choice of legal forum.117 
 
This raises the question if Tribunals are capability of creating predictability in the areas of 
investment law, particularly in regard to unified methodological approaches to tensions 
between competing interests in disputes arising from non-investment law, such as human 
rights law. For now, this might seem largely dependent on the individual arbitrators as well as 
the chosen applicable law. 
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115 Schill, "W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law," 888. 
116 Solanes and Jouravlev, Revisiting privatization, foreign investment, international arbitration, and water. 





Arbitrators are expected to make a decision independently and “shall judge fairly as between 
the parties, according to the applicable law.118 Apart from this, and the requirements to the 
content of an award, there are no clearly established ‘principles of justice’ or rule of law 
norms in the procedural rules. For now, this might seem largely dependent on the individual 
arbitrators as well as the chosen applicable law 
 
Another related concern that is being raised is the impact ad hoc tribunals have on securing 
coherency and predictability in decision-making and the development of investment law. In 
light of their often diverse backgrounds also raises the question of unified and responsible 
methodological approaches to tensions between competing interests in disputes arising from 
non-investment law, such as human rights law. This is particularly as ad hoc Tribunals are 
equipped with a wide scoped discretion as to the interpretation of the applicable law and 
procedural questions as it “shall be the judge of its own competence”.119 Arbitrators are 
expected to make a decision independently and “shall judge fairly as between the parties, 
according to the applicable law.120 Apart from this, and the requirements to the content of an 
award, there are no clearly established ‘principles of justice’ or rule of law norms in the 
procedural rules. For now, this might seem largely dependent on the individual arbitrators as 
well as the chosen applicable law. Arbitrators and tribunals are nevertheless the primary 
developers of international investment law through the high frequency of decisions-making 
and the use of its own case law as de facto precedents (see more under 2.7). One tribunal 
explicitly referred to the ‘duty’ of arbitrators to “contribute to harmonious development of 
investment law and thereby meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and 
investors towards certainty of the rule of law.”121  
 
General Comment No. 15 on the right to water sets out that States should encourage “judges 
adjudicators and members of the legal progression[…]to pay greater attention to the right to 
                                                        
118 ICSID, Rules of Precedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), 2006  Rule 6 (2) 
119 ICSID Convention (opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966), Art. 41 (41); J. 
Romesh Weeramantry, Treaty interpretation in investment arbitration, ed. Seies, Oxford international arbitration 
series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). p. 39-40; Gardiner  Richard K., Treaty Interpretation ed. Seies  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). p. 45; Ok Fauchald, "The legal reasoning of ICSID tribunals - An 
empirical analysis," Eur. J. Int. Law 19, no. 2 (2008).  p. 314.  
120 ICSID Arbitration Rules (April 10 ), Rule 6 (2) 
121 Saipem SpA v Bangladesh, (ICSID Case No ARB/05/07) Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendations on 
Provincial Measures, 21 March 2007. Para. 67.  
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water in the exercise of their functions.”122 Argentina argued for an a systemic integration of 
its responsibility to the human right water in the disputes under analysis in Part II. This is 
fully possible in investment arbitration under BITs as they are subject to the VCLT Art. 31 (3) 
(c) and “shall” therefore be interpreted in light of with “relevant rules” of international law.123  
Most States are parties to the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) where the right to water derives, and dispute over water would be deemed 
relevant. However, the ad hoc nature of Tribunals might first and foremost encourage dispute 
resolution in the context of single disputes, and not necessary with due regard for the larger 
body of international law which investment law undeniably is part of.  
 
2.6 Immediate Immunity & Enforceability of Decisions  
 
Art. 26 of the ICISD Convention provides that once an investor has filed a claim under the 
Convention this “shall (..) be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other 
remedy.”124 Art. 53 sets out that “the award should be binding on the parties and shall not be 
subject to any appeal or to any remedy except those provided for in the Convention,”125 
implying that arbitral decisions, unlike any other international decisions, are immune from 
court appeal review, and also under Art. 54 directly enforceable in signatory States ‘as if they 
were final judgements of a court in a State’.126 However, there are three remedies available 
under the ICSID Convention, namely interpretation, revision and annulment. The annulment 
committee is equally ad hoc consisting of three new arbitrators appointed by the Centre. Upon 
being granted annulment the case will have start all over from ground zero. Hence, there is no 
appellant body, although it is being discussed in light rule of law principles as well as in 
increasing amount of dissenting opinions being issued reflecting both legal polarization in 
terms of private/public law approaches, as well as an issue connected to the arbitrator 
affiliation with the disputing parties, as mentioned. This issue will be further elaborated under 
the case law analysis.  
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123 Vienna Convention (23 May, 1969), para. 31 (33) (c) 
124 ICSID Convention (opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966), Art. 26 (italics 
added) 
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One inescapable consequence of the immunity of awards are that they are excluded from 
examination as to their compliance with national law, constitutional, human rights law, and 
international law in general. Several of arbitral decisions against Argentina stemming from 
the financial crisis have been criticized as overturning the will of an elected government who 
enacted emergency legislation intended to benefit all that countries residents in the midst of a 
crisis of substantial dimensions, and hence, unduly intruding on national sovereignty without 
sufficiently respecting the states right to regulate in the public interest.127 Notably, Argentina 
has refused to comply with a number of ICISD awards and pay damages legally due to 
investors.128 Furthermore, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador decided to withdraw from ICSID 
altogether.129 The growing body of criticism rising from the ‘legitimacy crisis’ or IIA the can 
be summarized as concerns that investor-State arbitration constitutes an undemocratic transfer 
of public authority to “unaccountable”, confidential, ad hoc, supranational Tribunals that 
second-guess national law-making and regulation to the constraint of the States Sovereign 
right and ability to regulate in the public interest, with detrimental effects on human 
development and environmental sustainability.130 
 
The critique is rooted in the notion that tribunals and arbitrators are in reality acting as judges 
in courts in the transnational legal order which is an entirely different role than the one 
prescribed to commercial arbitration between private parties, on which the ICSID commercial 
procedural rules were modelled, but whom deal with dispute resolution between to 
contracting parties based on private law.131 Investor-State tribunals undertake evaluations of 
the legality of all aspects of government conduct, which means that, tribunals can overrule 
Supreme Court decisions in a given host State as well as any acts of the legislative, executive, 
provincial authorities, and find the State liable for citizens behavior . In the cases arising from 
the Argentina crisis the ad hoc Tribunals were reviewing the legality of the Argentine states 
emergency measures. How are they supposed to do that? The BIT clauses that the tribunals 
rely on in many cases only contain vaguely formulated standards such as “fair and equitable 
treatment”. How shall an ad hoc Tribunal, consisting of party appointed arbitrators from 
                                                        
127 Alvarez, "Lessons from the Argentina Crisis Cases," 257. P. 248  
128 Ibid., 254. 
129 Schill, "W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law," 895. 
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diverse backgrounds and in the shadow of privacy, evaluate the governments’ conduct in a 
complex emergency situation in a legitimate way against the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment? Several Tribunals additionally came to opposite conclusions as to Argentines 
contribution despite interpreting and applying the same customary rule on same emergency 
measures. For Argentina this distinction was in many cases the difference between livability 
and non-liability. In the Suez and Impregilo case the tribunal found that Argentina 
significantly contributed to the crisis,132 while the tribunal in the Urbaser case came to the 
opposite conclusion.133 Even more strikingly is it that Impregilo and Urbaser were the exact 
same concession although claims filed by different stakeholders.  
 
It is increasingly recognized investor-State dispute settlement in international tribunals is not 
solely concerned  disputes between private parties, but that investment disputes can have 
fundamental impacts on social life and that investment disputes, particularly over public 
utilities or public policy, can influence on the human rights of third-party individuals, 
communities and entire populations.134 Furthermore, public law sources are governing the 
dispute as to both mainly reviewing the legality of States public policy regulations vis-a-vis 
protection standards enshrined in public international law sources, not only BITs but also  
customary and general international law.135 Therefore, investment law and arbitration should 
be expected to adjudicate in accordance with VCLT Preamble and Articles 31-33, and resolve  
conflicts of tension through UN Charter Art. 103.136 Perhaps particularly so as they render 
immune decisions in non-transparent facilities where public interests are usually part.   
 
 
2.7 Transparency and de facto jurisprudence  
 
                                                        
132 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A v. Argentine Republic (ICSID 
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The 2006 amendment of ICSID Arbitration Rule137 48 (4) made the Centers case law more 
available to the public. Up to 2006 the publishing of anything beyond “excerpts of the legal 
rules applied in the award” required party consent.138 After the amendment the Centre could 
publish the “legal reasoning of the tribunal” and left it to the Tribunal to determine the content 
of the excerpts to be published, in the spirit of facilitating prompt publication of excerpts as it 
will “improve transparency and promote efficiency in the development of international 
law”.139 This is a transition that can largely be attributed to the civil society demand for 
greater transparency and is definitely a positive development from an accountability 
perspective. Today, hundreds of awards and decisions are easily available, and awards are 
rendered with high frequency.140  
 
Case law evidence active use of previous decisions, both obiter dicta and ratio decidendi, as 
important sources of law guiding interpretations and applications of protection standards in 
BITs.141 Despite that awards are only binding on the parties (ICISD Convention Art. 53) the 
increased use of case law in decision making, and States response to arbitral interpretations, 
rule amendments, dissenting opinions, annulments and academic writing is evidence of 
recognition of de facto judicial precedents and thus judicial lawmaking by arbitration 
tribunals.142  
 
One study from 2007 revealed that case law is actually the most frequently used source for 
legal argumentation in ICSID disputes, both by the disputing parties and Tribunals.143 The 
preference for precedents can be partly explained by the strikingly similar textual 
formulations of protection standards across BITs, in combination with the unifying effect of 
investment protection in a given host State through most-favored-nation clauses (MFN 
clauses) in BITs, the global ‘web’ of BITs increasingly posture an embryo of a multilateral 
order granting the same level of protection worldwide.144  This has marked a change in the 
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paradigm of international investment law, making arbitration Tribunals, and not necessarily 
the inter-State treaty-making process, the most important actor in developing the field of 
international investment law.145  
 
However, the increased transparency and scrutiny of case law has also revealed a large degree 
of inconsistencies in decisions based on essentially identical facts, BIT clauses, rules of 
customary international law, and an unpredictable willingness to deviate from case law 
accepted by previously Tribunals as having precedential value, particularly when interpreting 
controversial standards of which there is a large degree of inconsistent use.146 This is in 
addition to inconsistent methodological approached in general in light of the customary rules 
of treaty interpretation codified in VCLT articles 31-33 and in relation to the primary use of 
subsidiary legal sources as set out in ICJ Statute art. 38(1).147  
 
The unpredictability and inconsistency that is evident in case law have generated widespread 
critique of Tribunals, and manifold of new scholarly contributions, mainly produced by 
scholars coming from public international law, are voicing concern over the impact such 
inconsistencies might have on the predictability and coherency of international investment 
law which is in the interests of investors and well as States.148  
 
Chapter.3 Investment Law & Non-Investment Law  
 
3.1 Law applicable to disputes  
 
The jurisdiction of ICISD tribunals are strictly consent-based. Hence, the law the tribunals 
apply when settling disputes are restricted to the legal rules and instruments “agreed by the 
parties”, as set out in the ICISD Convention Art. 42 (1).149 When claims are anchored in 
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) provisions, the BIT become the primary lex specialis source 
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of law. BITs are consent based, limited party agreements with textual variations negotiated 
and enacted between two States committed to ascertain contractually established standards of 
protection to foreign investors from the Contracting State(s) operating within its territory. 
About 60% of its lawsuits resolved under ICSIDs jurisdiction has been filed under BITs, that 
is, arbitration clauses in BITs providing for dispute resolution under ICSID procedural rules 
which can be invoked by investors against States.150 
 
Most BITs do not explicitly include human rights standards.151 However, most BITs contain 
additional choice-of -law-clauses that can be utilised as supplementary or corrective sources 
of law, or as support and guidance in the process of interpretation of the often “vague” legal 
standards contained in BITs. The choice of law clauses in BITs regularly give reference to the 
host State law and ‘relevant’ or ‘applicable’ general principles of international law, and 
ultimately, the possibility of invoking national and international human rights law. For 
instance, the Argentina – Italy BIT Art. 8(7) provides that: 
 
 “The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the laws of the 
Contracting Party involved in the dispute – including its rules on conflict of laws – the 
provisions of this Agreement, the terms of any possible specific agreement concluded in 
relation to the investment as well as with the applicable principles of international law”.152   
   
As such, the Tribunals are not restricted to the claims and arguments of the parties in the 
decision making but must make a decision based on the factual circumstances in the case and 
on the appropriate law. ICISD Tribunals regularly look to international human rights law 
jurisprudence when interpreting or applying customary law or vaguely formulated investor 
protection standards, such as protection from direct and indirect expropriation, the concept of 
fair trail, due process and non-discrimination.153 In some cases, tribunals have also accepted 
jurisdiction over independent human rights law claims based on BIT clause referring to 
principles of international law. In the case Toto v. Lebanon154 the tribunal accepted an 
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investor claim to ‘right to a fair trail’ based directly on provisions in a human rights treaty of 
which Lebanon was a party.155 Historically speaking, both the international human rights 
body and investment arbitration regime incorporated certain normative standards and rights 
first found elsewhere, most notably in international custom.156 Several of the standard 
investment guarantees and protections fairly resemble, or have clear parallels to the 
fundamental rights found in international human rights law. The ultimate consequence of this 
is that some core protection standards, such as protection from expropriation and the right to a 
fair trail, can be subsumed into and dealt with under the single legal discipline of human 
rights law.157  
 
Tribunals are prohibited, as set out in the ICSID Convention Art. 42(2), from refusing to 
reach a decision on a claim for the reason that it finds no guidance to resolve the legal 
question raised in the law agreed between the parties. In those cases, the Tribunal is directed 
to resort to Art. 42, second sentence, which sets out that ‘in the absence of such [an agreement 
on the applicable law]’ the tribunal shall have recourse to the ‘law of the Contracting State’ 
and ‘such rules of international law as may be applicable’. The term ‘international law’ in this 
context is a reference to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,158 as 
set out in the preparatory works of the ICISD Convention.159  Through Article 38 (1) (a) – (d) 
international human rights law can become applicable source of law in several ways. First, 
through international human rights “conventions” (Art. 38(1)(a)) in force between the States 
represented by the nationality of the claimant investor and Respondent host State in a dispute. 
Secondly, through human rights law that is recognized as “international custom” 
(Art.38(1)(b). However, the existence of customary human rights law, beyond few high-
threshold jus cogens peremptory norms which in any case prevails treaty law,160 remains 
uncertain.161 Third, through human rights law recognized as “general principles” of 
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international law (Art. 38(1)(c). And forth, as subsidiarity means of interpretation under Art. 
38(1)(d), the tribunals can resort to (i) “judicial decisions” from e.g. the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),  and (ii) “the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists”.  
 
Hence, ICSID Convention Art. 42(1) second sentence is another access point for the 
applicability of national and international human rights law in investor-State disputes. The 
finding that various choice of law provisions in the investment law regime can support both 
supportive and supplementary application of human rights through interpretation of BIT 
provisions, and direct application of human rights is also supported in the literature.162 
 
Although the protection offered to investors vary from one individual agreement to another 
certain minimum standards found in most BITs bear strikingly similar textual formulations.163 
Some protection clauses usually found in most BITS the principle of ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’, the principle of ‘protection and security’ or the principle of ‘no expropriation 
without compensation’. The object and purpose of BITs varies also varies from one treaty to 
another, however most BITs have at least two recurring common objectives. First of all, to 
stimulate incoming flows of foreign investment by protecting it, which ultimately is intended 
to promote and enhance economic development, and second of all, to promote economic 
cooperation between the host and home State.164  The ordinary meaning of the notion of 
economic development165 implies that the purpose of a BIT is not limited to the protection of 
foreign investment, but ultimately to the shared intention of the contracting States of 
improved economic conditions for the populations in the contracting states. Treaties have 
been enacted between States and must be fulfilled within a framework acceptable to the State 
parties. As set out by the tribunal in Daimler v. Argentina case: 
 
“where a treaty claims is invoked, arbitral tribunals are called upon to interpret not 
merely the asymmetric contractual relationship between a sovereign state and a private 
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foreign investor, but to adjudicate whether a sovereign state has actually respected or violated 
the international obligations which it accepted with regard to the investment made by 
nationals of the other sovereign party to the same treaty.”166 
 
As such, the role of the arbitrator is to find the intent behind the State parties consent to the 
BIT clause. As treaties enacted by States are part of international public law they must be 
envisaged within its wider judicial context of general international law and be integrated into 
the international legal order in a systematic perspective for the purpose of unifying 
international law.167 This builds on an assumption that upon entering an investment treaty the 




State enters in to a BIT it exercises its sovereignty to contract away some of its sovereignty 
vis a vis the contracting parties, as it found this necessary to its objective of creating an 
investment-friendly climate.169 The legal obligations set out in treaties thus determines the 
future legality of State measures vis-à-vis an investor from the State of the Contracting party, 
as the State has bound itself to uphold the commitments “in good faith”, as required by Art. 
26 of the VCLT.170  
 
Nevertheless, the aspects of the States sovereignty that has not been contractually conditioned 
remain operational.171 However, what exactly remains operational, or the extent to which the 
state’s general regulatory scope has and can been restricted, that is, the extent to which 
general State regulations taken for a legitimate public purpose may negatively affect the value 
of an investment without becoming liable, remains unclear.172 In the context of privatization 
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of water management and human rights the contractual freedom of a State to contract away 
publicly owned resources and be strictly bound by these contracts regardless of if it is an 
undemocratic or unconstitutional treaty seems like an unresolved issue.173 The prevailing 
view seems still to be that contractual consent, good faith, pacta sunt servanda and party 
autonomy prevails all regardless of the issue of undemocratic governments, welfare-reducing 
acts, or the contracting away of basic common recourses, such as water. Even If treaties have 
profound negative impacts on constitutional rights these cannot be invokedas “[a] party may 
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a 
treaty”.174  The States international human rights obligations and investor obligation are 
regarded as belonging on the same hierarchal international legal order, and thus no right 
should prevail the other, unless is it of peremptory status which most human rights not yet 
enjoy. However, an increasingly preferred approach to identify the boundaries between two 
competing treaty interests has been through the balancing of interests.175 This will be 
discussed further down.  
 
3.2 Rights without representation 
Many of the investment disputes taken to ICISD concern public utilities and interests such as 
water, waste management, electricity, gas, but also protection of the environment, indigenous 
rights, health rights and affirmative action policies. The Tribunal in the Suez case, which was 
a dispute over water utilities, confirmed that public interests are prevalent in disputes:   
 
“the present case potentially involves matter of public interest. This case will consider the 
legality under international law, not domestic private law, of various actions taken by 
governments. The international responsibility of a state, the Argentine Republic, is also at 
stake, as oppose to the liability arising out of private law. While these factors are certainly 
matters of public interest, they are present in virtually all cases of investment treaty 
arbitration under ICSID jurisdiction»176 
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In the Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia case, also over water utilities, the amicus177  petition for 
submission argued that: 
 
«Because the arbitration arises out of actions by the Government of Bolivia to guarantee 
public order and access to water, the Tribunal’s decision in this case could implicate core 
government functions. The decision could also alter the legal obligations that apply to the 
Government of Bolivia when it regulates to protect public order and human health, as well as 
the economic and other factors it takes into account when deciding whether to do so»178 
 
This directly confirms the social impacts of ICSID disputes. Nevertheless, ICISD procedural 
rules do not automatically allow public observation or participation in disputes. This is in 
contradiction to the right to access to justice which the State is obliged to provide.179 In the 
Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia the had petitioners argued that international human rights 
principle of ‘access to justice’ supported their participation in the arbitration to submit amici 
curiae briefs.180 Their petition was dismissed as the Tribunal found that the request was 
“beyond the power or the authority of the Tribunal.”181 The case was settled with a US$1 
payment due waives of public protests, demonstrations and police violence, and one killed - 
described as a public uprising against a 50% increase in water tariff after the privatization of 
water supply in the city of Cochabamba’s.182  
 
The actuality of public interests in disputes has been shared by Tribunals, whom in 2005 in 
the Suez case allowed amicus curie briefs without prior consent from both parties as 
previously had been required with reference to the ICSID Conventions Art. 32 (2) which dealt 
with petition of third parties to attend hearings.183 The Tribunal nevertheless found an 
opening in the Suez case under the Convention Art. 44 which granted the tribunal residual 
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power to decide on the on unregulated questions as it differentiated hearings from 
submissions. The case was over water utilities in Argentina. The amicus in Agual del Tunari 
had invoked Art. 44 three years earlier. In the Suez case the Tribunals allowed amicus 
submission as it found that and a decision “will have the potential, directly or indirectly, to 
affect persons beyond those immediately involved as parties to the case”.184  
 
The jurisprudential development was codified in the 2006 amendment of Arbitration Rule 
(AR) 37 (2) for the purpose of allowing possible increased consideration of societal concerns 
in a dispute and “increasing the transparency of investor-state arbitration”.185  Now the AR 37 
(2)  allows submissions upon satisfying a number of criteria’s which are to be evaluated at the 
tribunals discretion.186  
 
Being granted Amicus status and permission to give submissions do not guarantee that such 
submission will have any influence decisions. Tribunals must however deal with all concerns 
raised, as set out in the ICSID Convention. Another limitation still on transparency is that 
permission to submit a amicus does not entail permission to attend the hearings of the case, 
nor the be given access to any of the documents of the case. These are separate petitions.  
Then the question become how much actual input can amicus briefs be expected to have.  In 
the Suez and Aguas del Tunari cases the amicus petition for access to hearings and 
documentation was rejected. 
 
3.3 Overly extensive interpretations  
 
With the knowledge that a decision in a dispute can reach far beyond the immediate parties it 
is upon the respondent State and the tribunal to give due regard to the non-investment 
interests of affected thirds parties. However, there are concerns that neither the State and nor 
the Tribunal presented with a case where the decisions can have impact on a wider audience 
do not accommodate competing concerns or norms by way of real and meaningful impact on 
when interpreting protection standards. However, as the party autonomy governing the 
proceedings already risks neglecting adversely affected but often not represented third parties 
and public interests judicial balancing of the public and private interests at stake is key to the 
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settlement of disputes in conformity with the governments human rights obligations and 
fundamental rights and freedoms.187   
 
The lack of balancing is evident when tribunals interpret protection clauses in BITs and end 
up applying a standard that is so restrictive that it almost nullifies the States regulatory space. 
This can undermine the States human right obligations, as the possibility of triggering costly 
lawsuits in international arbitration can give the State a strong incentive to be cautions to 
legislate in the public interests if it affects foreign investors, a phenomenon popularly referred 
to as the ‘regulatory chill’.188  In the words of arbitration practitioner and senior barrister 
Toby Landau QC  
“no State wants to be brought under a treaty to an international process. It has an 
impact upon diplomatic relations, it may have an impact upon a state’s credit standing[...]as a 
practitioner I can tell you that there are states who are now seeking advice from council in 
advance of promulgating particular policies in order to know whether or not there is a risk of 
an investor-state claim.”189  
 
Concerns over investments arbitrations constraints on the governments regulatory freedoms, 
and the risk of “regulatory chill” led the Australian government to a policy shift suggesting, 
among other things, to  more carefully constrained definitions of the FET standard in 
Australian treaties.190 Alvarez argues that, in cases relating to the supply of basic commodities 
such as water, a broadly interpreted treaty obligation to protect the investors property might 
be in conflict with the evolving set of positive international obligations States have 
undertaken under the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.191 
 
In case where the host State has infringed on investors rights in pursuit of its human rights 
obligations, the overall purpose of economic development and improvement of social 
conditions make human right concerns relevant in light of Executive Directors of the World 
Bank notice of the need to “maintain a careful balance between the interests of investors and 
those of host States.”  The Tribunal in the El Paso case acknowledge this:   
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“a balanced interpretation (…), taking into account both State sovereignty and the States 
responsibility to create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the development of 
economic activities, and the necessity to protect foreign investment and its continuing 
flow.”192  
 
This is transferable to water concessions as water falls within the right to adequate living and 
health, which are progressive rights with corresponding progressive responsibilities for 
States.193  
 
The significance of interpreting a treaty or contract in light of these broader purposes lies also 
in the admittance that the States regulatory ability is crucial to protect, respect and fulfil 
human rights.194 This ability is key to the realization of development because foreign 
investment itself does not automatically lead to economic growth but requires implementation 
of social and economic policies.195 By such, failing to balance public interest concerns of host 
States would be at risk of running counter to the scope and purpose of the body of investment 
law itself.196  
 
 
3.4 Tribunals approach to Human Rights Arguments  
 
The methodological approaches taken by tribunals confronted with human rights 
argumentation by either party in a dispute, or by a third-party through amicus curie 
submissions, have remained somewhat inconsistent and unclear on several points. For 
instance, tribunals regularly look to international human rights law jurisprudence when 
interpreting or applying customary law or vaguely formulated investor protection standards, 
such as protection from direct and indirect expropriation, and the concepts of fair trail, due 
process and non-discrimination.197 In contrast, consideration of the host States human rights 
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obligations advanced as an argument of justification for the States alleged wrongdoing when 
fundamental human rights have been at stake, has been far more reluctant.198 This is 
concerning as the State will be representing the interests of the host State population whom 
are precluded from becoming parties to the dispute although they might be adversely affected 
by decisions.  
 
As the main objective of the regime has been perceived to be protection of foreign investors 
investments from State abuse, the relevancy of international human rights law as 
interpretative or independent arguments and claims might be higher and thus more easily 
influence on decisions when the human rights arguments coincide with the objectives of 
investment law, such as protection of property, or when the human rights arguments overlap 
with a broadly formulated BIT clause that need to be supplemented.199 This has nonetheless 
led some scholars accuse tribunals of being one-sided and selective in their approach when 
determining the substantive content of the host States human rights obligations, and 
demonstrate a bias in favor of property rights that are ignorant to the undividable nature of 
human rights, and the prohibition against privileging some human rights over others.200 
Related approached to human rights will be further discussed under 4.5.  
 
Conclusion 
As bilateral investment treaties are part of public international law, they can and should be 
interpreted in harmony with the greater body of international law. However, this is not 
necessarily the status quo. There are often public interests at stake in disputes, but limited 
representation due to procedural restrictions. Tribunals are willing and capable of judicial 
borrowing from or direct application of human rights law, but seem to do this in a biased 
manner.  




This chapter will focus on some of the concerns related to how the protective investment 
rights affects human rights, particularly the ‘fair and equitable’ (FET). The FET standard has 
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been the most successful protection standards on behalf of investors, and also the most 
controversial in light of the concerns raised over treaties’ potential effect of undermining 
human rights in the country that is hosting the investment.  
 
 
4.2 What is the content of the FET standard? 
 
The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard (hereafter the FET standard) is phrased slightly 
differently in different bilateral investment treaties. Interpreted in the context of a specific 
treaty with its specific history, object and purpose, one might naturally expect finding 
different interpretive results of the FET standard as in accordance with Art. 31 of the 
VCLT.201 This however is not the most convincing explanation for the inconsistent adoption 
of the standard by ICISD Tribunals, but rather the ad hoc, and unintended interrelationship 
among the thousands of BITs worldwide.202 As most FET standards in BITs enacted in the 
1990s203 were modelled on similar textual structures characterized as being ‘general’ and 
‘vague’, the substantive content of the FET standard was highly uncertain as the ordinary 
meaning of “fair and equitable treatment” gives little intuitive guidance as to its objective 
components, there are still a great deal of uncertainties as to the standards substantive 
content.204  
 
Although there are general guiding objectives to the what kind of ‘treatment’ that would be 
‘unfair’ and ‘unequitable’ the doctrine is still open ended and highly fact driven as it  
“depends on the interpretation of specific facts for its content.”205 The lack of specificity left 
vast amounts of interpretative flexibility to the discretion of the arbitrator to adopt it to the 
variety of contexts and facts, essentially as it enabled Tribunals to assess “virtually all 
relevant facts and arguments”.206 Hence, the judgement of what is fair and equitable depends 
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largely on the facts of a particular case, and consequently, on how the Tribunals understands 
and weights the facts and evidence presented to it.  
 
Generally speaking however, the term “fair and equitable” is understood as a standard that 
requires State conduct towards the investor to be predictable, transparent, non-arbitrary, non-
discriminatory, not amount to a denial of justice, and nor frustrate the investors legitimate 
expectations.207 Essentially, the purpose of FET standards is to fill the protection gaps that is 
left by the more specific protection standards, such as clauses prohibiting unlawful 
expropriation, in order to obtain the intended investor protection, such as offer compensation 
where there the claim for indirect expropriation was rejected. 208  
 
From the investors perspective the FET clause is a protection from political risks such as 
legislation that negatively effects the value of the investment (including expected profit-
making) or the overseas bankability and debt payment to international banks. This must be 
distinguished from business risk which would derive from the contracts. Political risk then 
becomes all acts of States in their Sovereign capacity, such as legislative and executive acts of 
governments, that negatively affect the investor unless the investor should have legitimately 
expected the government to act in the manner it did.  
 
 One the one hand, the investor needs protection from States who misuse their regulatory 
power and justifies it by claiming it was for a public purpose. The unclear scope of the 
concept of ‘public purpose’, States ‘inherent right to regulate’ or its ‘police powers’ remain 
and overhauling business risk for any foreign investor. On the other hand, the States 
regulatory task to progressively regulate is paramount to is ability to carry out its legitimate 
mandate, to uphold its duties vis-à-vis its population, to protect the foreign investor, and to 
maintain an investment-friendly climate.209 
 
The concept of FET has appeared in international documents and treaties for decades. 
However, it is only since the late 1990s that investment tribunals started giving content to the 
meaning of the standard enshrined in the context of BITs.210 Its evolution has thus primarily 
                                                        
207 Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, 161. 
208 Ibid., 160. 
209 Ibid., 77. 
210 Ibid., 159-160. 
 45 
been developed by arbitrators in a series of what has been deemed ‘highly inconsistent 
interpretations and applications of the standard, and a general lack of justification (legal 
authority) for the principles substantive content, particularly with regards to the assertion that 
FET encompasses the “legitimate expectations” doctrine, as Tribunals generally seems 




4.3 Regulatory Risk  
 
From the investors perspective the FET clause is a protection from political risks such as 
legislation that negatively effects the value of the investment (including expected profit-
making) or the overseas bankability and debt payment to international banks. This must be 
distinguished from business risk which would derive from the contracts. Political risk then 
becomes all acts of States in their Sovereign capacity, such as legislative and executive acts of 
governments, that negatively affect the investor unless the investor should have legitimately 
expected the government to act in the manner it did.  
 
 One the one hand, the investor needs protection from States who misuse their regulatory 
power and justifies it by claiming it was for a public purpose. The unclear scope of the 
concept of ‘public purpose’, States ‘inherent right to regulate’ or its ‘police powers’ remain 
and overhauling business risk for any foreign investor. On the other hand, the States 
regulatory task to progressively regulate is paramount to is ability to carry out its legitimate 
mandate, to uphold its duties vis-à-vis its population, to protect the foreign investor, and to 
maintain an investment-friendly climate.212 
 
There are concerns that arbitrators interpret FET in a way that constrain the States from 
regulating in the best way for the public interests over time with changing circumstances, 
resources and knowledge, or to take necessary ‘good governance’ measures to respond to a 
financial crisis, unaffordable tariff hikes or pollution. 213 The FET can possibly require the 
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state to abstain from new regulation that effects the investment such as environmental laws, or 
require state compensation for investor compliance with a new laws.214 This is concerning, as 
overreaching interpretations of BIT clauses can be used as de facto precedents for a long time 
to come. 
 
4.3 Regulatory Chill and Regulatory Duty   
The States’ guarantee to provide foreign investors with ‘fair and equitable treatment’ (FET) 
by not frustrating their “legitimate expectations” is the standard with the lowest threshold for 
investors claims, which puts strict restraints on the public policy space of governments and 
therefore contains a high possibility for a regulatory chill effect.  
 
There is a general consensus among investment scholars that the FET standard does not, or 
should not, be interpreted to deter the States legitimate right to regulate in the public purpose, 
and as such, that the investor cannot expect absolute stability in the legal framework in the 
host state.215 As Schreuer says FET standard does not require a total standstill of legislation 
but that “any drastic changes to that framework, that seriously affects the investment, is likely 
to constitute a breach of the BITs FET standard”.216 However, others have gone so far as to 
describe the FET standard adopted by some Tribunals as being an impossible goal that 
essentially freezes the States legislation by “requiring a state of perfect public regulation in a 
perfect world, to which all states should aspire but very few (if any) will ever attain”.217 
 
Perhaps as a response to the critique, a number of recent arbitral decisions stand for the 
proposition that the FET standard must be interpreted such as not to interfere with the host 
States ability and right to regulate domestic matters in the public interest in a non-
discriminatory way, and that this can be taken into consideration by Tribunals through 
balancing the investors legitimate expectations and the host states interest, right and duty to 
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regulate in the public interest.218 From the point of view of arbitral governance, an essential 
outcome of the balancing analysis is to contribute to a developing a coherent and well-
reasoned balancing scheme under the FET standard to contribute to the laws predictability 
and legitimacy.219  
   
However, if the tribunal finds that these expectations are immutable from the time of 
investment it nonetheless provides the investor with protection from progressive regulations 
as required by the State in a human rights law perspective, particularly in the area of 
economic and social rights. When water services are controlled by private pro-profit operators 
the effectiveness and realization of the right to water for the population largely depends on 
State enforcement regulation of the private operator.220 A dissertation undertaking case law 
analysis of disputes arising out of Argentina’s economic crisis concluded that with an 
investor-friendly interpretation of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard without regard 
for the situation in the country the “developing countries run the risk of being overburdened 
with liabilities” and that the cases “raise alarms for developing countries in the future.”221 The 
concern of lack of attention to factual circumstances thus runs risk of neglecting the interests 
at stake.  
 
4.4 Relationship with customary minimum standard  
Traditionally, the issue of protecting foreign nationals from ‘unacceptable treatment’ 
and denial of justice was accommodated on the international level by the gradual 
establishment of customary ‘minimum standards of the treatment of aliens’.222 The 
international minimum standard historically concerned the status of aliens in general and not 
specifically foreign investors, and therefore encompass diverse areas of rights, including 
rights in regard to private property held by aliens.223  
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Some of the fundamental uncertainties is the scope of the standard, and its relationship 
with customary- and general international law.224 In the USA – Argentina BIT (1991) Art. II 
2.a) the FET standard is formulated like this:  
 
“Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full 
protection and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by 
international law”.225  
 
In the Netherland – Argentina BIT (1991) Art. 3 1. The FET standard is formulated 
differently:  
 
“Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment to investments of 
investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair, by unreason or discriminatory 
measures, the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal thereof by 
those investors”.226 
 
The US-Argentina BIT above has a reference to both FET and relevant treatment standards 
flowing from international law. This indicates that FET standard is a distinct rule that already 
exist in international law and also an autonomous rule flowing from the BIT. In the 
Netherland-Argentina BIT there is no reference to international law, indicating that it refers to 
the FET standard as a self-standing and autonomous. These textual differences can potentially 
have far reaching impact on the type of State actions the investor is protected against, and 
consequently, the scope of the States regulatory space. None of the standards define the 
content of the FET guarantee nor their clear relationship to the customary minimum law 
standard.  
 
The customary guarantee of fair and equitable treatment is regarded as a minimum standard 
providing a narrower scope of protection than an ‘autonomous’ FET standard in international 
investment law.227 However, the gravity of the negative effect required for a State act to 
amount to unjust or unequitable treatment is somewhat uncertain under both the ‘autonomous’ 
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FET standard in BITs and the customary international law are still evolving concepts.228 The 
‘minimum’ standard is typically identified as requiring bad intent, or at least look at the states 
intention with a measures. The ‘other’ standard is characterized as looking only at the effects 
of the States measures.   
 
It is argued that FET, when provided in BITs, must be presumed to go beyond being a mere 
restatement of customary international law as in accordance with the principle of effective 
interpretation, as the investor would always be protected via the minimum standard.229 
However, others contend that in the 1990s, when the BITs relevant for this paper were signed, 
there was no such thing as an autonomous FET standard, and therefore assigning the investors 
with more protection than what is found in the customary law minimum standard would go 
against the intent and consent of the signatory states.230 
 
The difference may no longer be decisive. A case law study from 2011 indicated that most 
arbitral decisions issued up until 2011 equate the FET standard in international law and the 
FET standard in BITs, or that they at least indicate that the FET standard in BITs must be 
informed by the international law standard.231  
 
Furthermore studies, suggest that most tribunals have not emphasized the textual differences 
among FET clauses in BITs, but indicate that arbitrators look for common, objective 
principles of interpretations underlying the FET standard.232 As such ‘entangled’ approaches 
to little defined standards in treaty and custom, have, and will continue to influence on the 
meaning of the customary law FET standards due to mergence.233  Consequently, when the 
BIT text or the interpretation of arbitrators link the FET guarantee in the BIT with those 
existing in customary international law or general principles of law, the result of what is 
considered as’ relevant’ public policy, might have evolved to extend or limit the scope of the 
States regulatory space.234  
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Alvarez suggest that “in substance the rights it [the FET standard] accords may now be the 
same as those under customary law”,235  and that the ‘evolving’ FET standard might be 
conflict with the also evolving nature of the States international human rights obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil the human rights, particularly the right to water and health.236  If 
customary law is evolving in the direction of encompassing more rights for private legal 
entities to the detriment of States right to regulate in a non-discriminatory way in the public 
interest this can ultimately weaken the position of human rights in international law in 
general. Because ISDS effectively incorporate customary international law into a system that 
generates case law on an high frequency that are publicly available and being used as legal 
sources it is likely to change the rules of custom,237  and that indeed extensive evidence 
already exist that interpretation of protection provisions in BITs are expanding the reach of 
customary international law.238  
Furthermore, the positive developments in the improved ‘third generation BITs’ which are 
being modelled in our time and which actively and explicitly trying to secure more regulatory 
discretion to the State,239 particularly in relation to the FET standard, might be disregarded as 
many of the new FET standards are simply giving a more explicit reference to the customary 
minimum standard.  
 
For instance, the 2009 Australia – Chile Free Trade Agreement specifically clarified that ‘fair 
and equitable’ treatment standard refers to the customary international law minimum standard 
of treatment of aliens, and provides the presumption that non-discriminatory regulation in the 
name of public health, safety, and the environment does not constitute indirect 
expropriation.240 But, as Alvarez analysis suggest the customary law standard might have 
changed. This means that an overreaching FET standard might be hard to escape for States 
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model-agreement-english.pdf (is said to reflect a direction away from a sole focus on investment protection by 
emphasizing the states ability to regulate for the protection of health, human rights, safety, and environmental 
issues).  
240 McNeill, "Investor-State Arbitration: Striking a Balance Between Investor Protections and States’ Regulatory 
Imperatives " 278. (referring to the Australia-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Articles 10.5(2) and Annex 10b)  
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unless it is formulated in such a specific way that there is no need or opening for recourse to 
neither case law nor customary law. Furthermore, the FET clauses in new Model BITs might 
be disregarded by the inclusion of an MFN clause that the investor can invoke to avoid textual 
‘improvements’.  
 
4.5 Intention behind State measures  
The success of States invocation of its human rights obligations under the FET 
standard to justify state action as been observed to depend upon “whether the objective of a 
measure plays a role in determining the existence of a breach or whether the severity and the 
impact on the investor is the decisive criterion”.241 Case law bears witness that neither the 
objective behind a measure, nor its benefit to society as a whole plays a role for the 
assessment of BIT breaches.  As set out by the Tribunal in the CMS v. Argentina case  
“the Tribunal… does not have jurisdiction over measures of general economic policy 
adopted by … Argentina and cannot pass judgement on whether they are right or wrong. The 
Tribunal also concludes, however, that it has jurisdiction to examine whether specific 
measures affecting the Claimant’s investment or measures of general economic policy having 
a direct bearing on such investment have been adopted in violation of legally binding 
commitments made to the investor in treaties, legislation or contracts.”242 
  
This means that, as a general established rule, the objective behind the States actions is 
regarded as irrelevant to the finding of wrongdoing. Hence, legislation passed with the 
purpose of adjusting to changing social, economic and technological conditions applied in a 
non-discriminatory fashion could come to constitute a violation of the FET standard, if it was 
proven to have seriously affected the investor, regardless of the positive effects it might have 
to the general population in the host State.  
 
In the SAUR International v. Argentina243  case, in response to the claimant’s argument that 
the objective of the measures is irrelevant, the Tribunal said that human rights in general, and 
particularly the human right to water were sources the Tribunal could take into account in the 
dispute.244 This exception might be because the emergency legislation was taken to prevent 
                                                        
241 Kube and Petersmann, "Human Rights Law In International Investment Arbitration," 72. 
242 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8) Decision on 
Jurisdiction, (17 July 2003 ).para. 33 (italics added) 
243 "Human Rights Law In International Investment Arbitration," 81. 
244 Ibid., 83. (As the decision is not available in English I rely on Petersmann and Kube’s accounts of SAUR 
International S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 
para. 328 (June 6, 2012).) 
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public disorder stemming directly from how the investor managed the water services,245 and 
because the water service had been privatized for the purpose of securing the human right to 
water. Attention to the objective could possibly adjust the proportionality balancing. Despite 
this, Kube and Petersmann observes that Tribunals payed little attention to the States duty to 
alleviate and prevent treats to the human right to water situation of a population enduring the 
hardship of an economic crisis.246 The reluctance to apply a “rights based approach” has as a 
consequence that the human rights are “hardly taken into consideration in substantive 
terms”,247 even when the State argues that the measures under review were taken to comply 
with its human rights obligations.  
 
4.6 Open ended standard that can allow innovative approaches  
 
From a more optimistic point of view the standards flexibility on a case by case basis and its 
lack of precision can have the benefit of leading the arbitrator to have recourse to 
supplemental principles, such as customary international law of general principles of law, 
which can give the application of FET greater coherence and legitimacy in the international 
law system, and why “progressive” evolution to secure a more balanced approach to the 
interest at stake in IIL can be possible. 248  
 
An empirical analysis of interpretive arguments in 98 ICISD decisions rendered between 
January 1998 to December 2006, found that 73 out of 98 decision used legal doctrine as an 
interpretative argument.249 This made legal doctrine the second most frequently used 
argument used, exceeded only by ICISD case law.250  In light of the on-going legitimacy 
debate taking place within the legal doctrine of investment law and international public law as 
regard to the FET standard, it is not an entirely unlikely prediction that the FET standard can 
be a tool to incorporate the larger body interests at stake in a dispute, while still maintaining 
its own objectives. The prediction is not necessarily substantially weakened by the even more 
frequent use of case law as interpretive arguments, as the study found that Tribunals to a large 
                                                        
245 Alvarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment 371. 
246 Kube and Petersmann, "Human Rights Law In International Investment Arbitration," 82, 83, 84, . (assessment 
an analysis of arbitral awards where human rights arguments have been invoked. Assesses several early and 
recent cases relating to the Argentina crisis. This award is not available in English) 
247 Ibid., 69. 
248 Alvarez, "Fair and Equitable Treatment: The Heart of the Investment Regime," 242.   
249 Fauchald, "The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis," 351.  
250 Ibid.  
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degree were willing to deviate from previous case law, particularly when interpreting 






 Case Law Analysis  
PART II  
 
Chapter 5.  Establishing a Human Right to Water in Argentina   
 
“It is very important to understand that international law is law.” 
- Lord Bingham  
 
 
5.1 When Access to Water Depends on The Commercial Interests   
 
This chapter will identify the content of the in Argentina and the Argentine States 
corresponding international and national obligations on a general level. The objective is to 
establish a legal background in a parallel normative sphere to the three investor-State disputes 
that will reviewed. The over public water services for the for the case law analysis in order to 
evaluate the approach taken by investor-State Tribunals to accommodate human rights 
arguments and concerns in disputes over water privatized water utilities.  
 
The question is how if and when Argentina’s international obligation to water was 
‘established’. In addition, it must also be established if any national laws provide the citizens 
with the right to water as this equally would inform the regulatory framework for the 
concession contact and be justiciable in investor-State arbitration under the doctrine of 
                                                        
251 Ibid., 331.  
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‘legitimate expectations’ and the interpretation of the mandated of the Regulatory Entity of 
the concessions who were to protect the ‘rights’ of users.252  
 
 
5.2 A Human Right to Water in Argentina? 
 
Argentina has a long tradition for recognizing the importance of providing safe and equitable 
drinking water. In 1977 in Mar del Plata, Argentina hosted the UNs first Conference on Water 
where it outlined the first ever Action Plan for an internationally coordinated approach to 
water resource management, recognizing “all peoples, whatever their stage of development 
and social and economic conditions, have the right to have access to drinking water in 
quantities and of a quality equal to their basic needs.”253  
 
Argentina has ratified a number of international human rights conventions and a great number 
of them were directly incorporated ‘in the full force of their provisions’ under Article 75(22) 
of the Constitution after the 1994 constitutional amendment.254 The international treaties with 
constitutional rang in Article 75(22) included: 
 
«The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the 
International Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights 
and its empowering Protocol;…the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Woman;…the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child» 
 
Several of the ‘specialized’ human rights treaties provide explicitly for the right to water for 
certain vulnerable groups, such as women, children and people with disabilities.255 As such, 
                                                        
252 Suez case concession contract, signed 28 April 1993, in effect 1 May 1993 (Art. 5.3 on ‘The relationship 
between the Regulatory authority and the concession’: “..control powers in a reasonable manner, considering 
especially the rights and interests of the users”) 
253 United Nations, Report of the UN Water Conerence, Mar del Plata, Argentina 14-25 March 1977, 
E/CONF.70/29,  
254 Constitution of the Argentine Nation (revised version of 1994), 1994 (adopted 1 May, 1853),(english 
version), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=282508 (4 April 2018); María Belén Olmos Giupponi 
and Martha C. Paz, "The Implementation of the Human Right to Water in Argentina and Colombia," Anuario 
Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, no. 15 (2015): 336 (footnote 357). 
255 UN General Assembly Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 18 
December 1979, A/RES/34/180,  Art. 14 (2) (h), (ratified by Argentina 15 July, 1985); UN General Assembly, 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3,  Art. 24 
(2) (c) (ratified by Argentina 4 December 1990); UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons 
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these specialized groups have a right to water in Argentina with corresponding international 
obligations on the Argentine State. In a case from 1999 the Provincial High Court granted 
protection to children who drank contaminated water based partly on the Constitution and the 
right to “adequate…clean drinking water” enshrined in the UN Convention on the Right of 
the Child Art. 24 2.(c).256 However, none of these specialized treaties provide a human right 
to water on a general basis for all people.  
 
In a civil lawsuit 1997 was brought against the Province about contaminated water and the 
province was found liable for acting in violation of the constitutional rights to health and to a 
safe environment.257 The applicable law made reference to regional and international human 
rights instruments including the National Constitution Art. 41,258 the ICESCR art. 12 (right to 
health), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art 25 (right to standard of living and 
health), the Convention of the Rights of the Child Art. 24 and the National Constitution Art. 
41 (environment).259  
 
The general right to health and the right to an adequate standard of living is enshrined in the 
legally binding instrument of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) art. 11(1) (living) and Art. 12 (health).260 Argentina ratified the ICESCR on August 
8, 1986 without reservations.261 Argentina was also one of the 122 countries that voted in 
favor of Resolution 64/292.262  
 
                                                        
with Disabilities : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/106,  Art. 28.2.a) 
(ratified by Argentina 2 September, 1989) 
256 Defensoría de Menores Nº 3 c. Poder Ejecutivo Municipal” (02/03/1999). Discussed in: "The 
Implementation of the Human Right to Water in Argentina and Colombia," 338. 
257 Children of the Paynemil Community c/ Acción de amparo , 2nd Chamber of Appeals for Civil Matters of the 
Province of Neuquén, File 311–CA – 1997 (19 May 1997) as discussed in: WaterLex, THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
TO WATER AND SANITATION IN COURTS WORLDWIDE: 
A SELECTION OF NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW,2014, 
https://www.waterlex.org/new/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Case-Law-Compilation.pdf (27 May), pp. 87-89 
258 Constitution of the Argentine Nation (revised version of 1994), (1994 (adopted 1 May, 1853)); (Art. 42: 
“right to a healthy, balanced environment, apt for human development”. Art. 42: “The authorities shall provide 
[…] the control of quality and efficiency of public utilities, and the creation of consumer and user associations. 
Legislation shall establish […] regulations for national public utilities”) 
 
260 ICESCR (1966), Art. 11(11) and Art. 12  
261 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, "View the ratification status by country or 
by treaty: Ratification Status for Argentina "  
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=7&Lang=en. (accessed 4 April 
2018) 
262  Human Rights Council : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, (3 April 2006 ) 
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At the time of the privatization of water services in the early 1990s-2000, and well before the 
invocation of disputes in the ICSID, the right to water was and international specialized 
human right, international general human right and constitutional right in Argentina. As none 
of the general instruments specifically refer to the right to water the content and the status of 
the content must be established.  
 
5.3 Content of the Right 
 
Since the 1990s a wide number of General Comments have been passed by the UN expert 
monitoring body for the ICESCR the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) recognizing the right to water as a derivative right under the Covenant. In Art 
General Comment No. 4 on the right to right to adequate housing under Art. 11 (1) the 
CESCR underlined as early as 1991 that access to safe drinking water was an essential part of 
the right to adequate housing.263 The 2000 General Comment No. 14 on the highest attainable 
standard of health makes several statements on the ‘access to safe and potable drinking water’ 
as part of the ‘underlying determinants of health’ which includes accessibility, quality, 
adequacy and a healthy environment.264 
 
 Of particular significance was the 2002 General Comment No. 15265 (hereafter GC15) which 
established a thorough legal basis for the right to water under the ICESCR Art. 11(1) and art. 
12.266 GC15 established that ‘everyone’ under the right to health and the right to adequate 
standard of living  has a right to ‘sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and 
affordable water’ and set out a norm prioritizing the allocation of water  “for personal and 
domestic uses” and “to prevent starvation and disease”.267 The legal status of instruments UN 
general comments and resolutions are not legally binding on States but are ‘soft law’ tools 
which provide recommendations that function as important authoritative sources of 
interpretation of already existing, and legally binding human rights.268 State parties to the 
                                                        
263 General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant),13 December 1991 
E/1992/23, http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079a1.html (4 April 2018), para. 8 (b) 
264 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, CESCR General Comment No. 14: The Right to the 
Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art.12) 11 August 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, paras. 11, 12 (a), (b) and (d), 
15, 34, 36, 40, 43 and 50 
265 CESR, General Comment No. 15 (2002),   
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid., para. 6. 
268 Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945),  (The functions and powers of the UN General Assembly is 
set out in Chapter IV Art. 9 – 17 does not mention any authorization to issue legally binding comments, but 
emphasise its role in making  “recommendations”.); Human Rights Council : resolution / adopted by the General 
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Covenant are inclined to accept the committee’s expert interpretation through their obligation 
to take the necessary steps to set realize the rights in the ICESCR as set out in Art. 2 (1), and 
because the state parties have “agreed”, as provided in Art. 23 of the ICESCR, that 
achievement of full realization necessitates the “adoption of recommendations”.269  
 
Hence, the obligations deriving from resolutions and general comments would depend on the 
level of acceptance by the State of such obligations. In 1995 the Argentine Supreme Court 
explicitly required local courts to take account of international interpretative guidelines when 
interpreting domestic law, such as UN General Comments.270 GC15 confirms its justiciability 
states that “incorporation in the domestic legal order of international instruments recognizing 
the right to water[…]enables courts to adjudicate violations of the right to water, or at least 
the core obligations, by direct reference to the Covenant.”271.  In a case from 2004 CG15 was 
directly invoked in a civil lawsuit against the local and provincial government by several 
NGOs in relation to contamination of water services that was managed by the private 
concessionaire Suez in the provincial town of Cordoba.272 The plaintiffs invoked their right to 
water, arguing with reference to GC15 that irrespective of the privatization of water utilities 
in the province, the State was the guarantor of human rights.273 
 
Therefore, I safely conclude that the CG15 and other UN instruments contain obligations on 
behalf of the Argentine State and rights for the citizens.  
 
5.4 Applicability vis-à-vis Claimants in International Disputes  
 
Argentina ratified the ICESCR before the privatization and before entering into any of the 
BITs invoked by the foreign investors in the disputes. This was also true for the all the 
                                                        
Assembly, (3 April 2006 ); Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 18 June 
2007,A/HRC/RES/5/1, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ae9acbbd.html (2 April 2018) (These founding 
documents of the Human Rights Council does not mention any authorization for issuing legally binding 
documents); see also Thielbörger, The Right(s) to Water : The Multi-Level Governance of a Unique Human 
Right. 60.; Stephen Hall, "Researching International Law," in Research Methods for Law, ed. Mike McConville 
and Wing Hong Chui (Edinburgh: Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 202. 
269 ICESCR (1966),  
270 Horiacio David Giroldi (No.32/93) 7 April, 1995, discussed in Bronwen Morgan, "Turning Off the Tap: 
Urban Water Service Delivery and the Social Construction of Global Administrative Law," European Journal of 
International Law 17, no. 1 (2006): 233. 
271 CESR, General Comment No. 15 (2002),  
272 CEDHA v Provincial State and Municipality of Cordoba (AC) October 2004, discussed in "Turning Off the 
Tap: Urban Water Service Delivery and the Social Construction of Global Administrative Law," 232-233. 
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contracting States to the BITs.274 As such, the State parties to all of the BITs had obligations 
under the ICESCR upon negotiation and enactment. Hence, interpretation of BIT clauses 
should be done with due regard for the States obligation to the ICESCR, and if necessary be 
used to limit the scope of a BIT clause as it cannot be presumed that either State party 
indented to silently contract away other treaty obligations. Particularly obscure would such an 
interpretation become as the treaties have corresponding objectives: economic development. 
Additionally, as the nature of the Covenants’ right and obligation are of progressive nature it 
must be presumed that they can be informed by new interpretative developments as well as in 
line with advancements in economy, technology, science and so on. 
 
Chapter 6. The Impact of the Recognition of the Human Right to 
Water – Case Study    
 
«Wars of the future will be fought over water, as they today over oil, as the source of all life 
enters the global marketplace and political arena. Corporate giants, private investors, and 
corrupt governments vie for control of our dwindling fresh water supply, prompting protests, 
lawsuits, and revolutions from citizens fighting for the right to survive. Past civilizations have 
collapsed from poor water management» 
 
Blue Gold: World Water Wars (2009), documentary by 
Sam Bozzo 
 
6.1 Introduction  
In 2002 Argentina was hit by a severe financial crisis that triggered the largest number of 
investor-State claims taken to the ICISD directed at a single state in the history of investment 
treaties.275 Some of the earlier awards stemming from the crisis have been criticized for the 
regulatory restraints placed on Argentine to respond in a suitable way without risking lawsuits 
by foreign investors to international arbitration. The earlier lawsuits over privatized water 
utilities have been criticized for not sufficiently taking into account the public interests at 
stake, particularly the States obligations to protect the human right to water for its citizens.276  
                                                        
274 Argentina-France BIT (1991) - France ratified ICESCR in 1980, Argentina-Spain BIT (1991) - Spain ratified 
the ICESCR in 1977; Argentina-Italy BIT (1990) - Italy ratified the ICESCR in 1978; Argentina-UK BIT (1990) 
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275 Alvarez, "Lessons from the Argentina Crisis Cases." P. 248  
276 Kube and Petersmann, "Human Rights Law In International Investment Arbitration," 82, 83, 84, . (As the 
decision is not available in English I rely on Petersmann and Kubes’ accounts of SAUR International S.A. v. The 
Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4) Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, para. 328 (Tribunal 
agreed that Argentina has a responsibility in relation to the human right to water but refused to recognize its 
impact on the BIT provision);  
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The criticism has also targeted Argentines failure to sufficiently substantiate the arguments 
invoking its own obligation to safeguard the human right to water for its citizens.277   
 
However, since the earlier awards several reforms have taken place within the ICSID related 
to increased transparency and codification the tribunals discretion to allow amicus 
submissions.278 There also seems to have taken place positive development in the case law as 
to taking more balanced approach to the States interest to regulate in the public interest, 
particularly in cases concerning water disputes because of the close relationship between the 
purpose of the investment in realizing access to safe drinking water. Furthermore, a 
substantial amount of academic writing has been produced on relationship between human 
rights and investment protection. Perhaps most importantly is the elevation of the human right 
to water in 2010 through United Nations General Assembly Resolution 64/292 ‘recognizing’ 
by consensus that the human right to water is an independent right essential to the full 
enjoyment of life and all human rights.279  This chapter analysis three of the latest, publicized 
decisions available in English, rendered between 2010 and 2016..  
 
6.2 Summary of disputes Suez280, Impregilo281 & Urbaser282 
In the following I will give a general introduction to all three disputes as they are highly 
comparable, particularly the Impregilo case and the Urbaser cases as they were over the same 
concession. The lawsuits were triggered by transnational water companies against the 
Argentine State in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The claims were over privatized water 
services in the City and Province of Buenos Aires, and surrounding municipalities, of which 
one was the largest concession in the world serving almost 10 million people. The 
concessions were given for 30 years, with exclusive rights. The concessions for water and 
sewage provisions were operated by locally registered companies as requested by Argentine 
in the bidding terms. The claimants in the disputes were transnational water companies as 
investors and foreign shareholders whom had created or held shares in local entities formally 
operating the concession. The concessions were under the control and regulation of a public 
regulatory entity responsible for monitoring compliance, penalize, approve tariff adjustments 
                                                        
277 Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12) Award, para. 260. (Tribunal noted that 
Argentina’s human right to water had “not been fully argued”) 
278 Antonietti, "The 2006 Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations and the Additional Facility Rules." 
279 A/HRC/RES/15/9,  
280  
281 Impregilo v Argentine (ARB/07/17) Award (2011). 
282 Urbaser and CABB v. Argentina (ARB/07/26) Award (2016). 
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and protect the rights of users. The objectives for the concessions were to improve water 
services, maintenance and expansion of safe drinking water and sanitation services. The 
concessionaires were responsible for maintenance, project design, construction, rehabilitation 
and expansion of all works required for service provision. Before the crisis broke out in full, 
the concessions started running in to financial trouble and requested tariff adjustment and 
revised expansion goals. When the 2002 financial crisis hit the country, the government 
passed a number of emergency laws that impacted negatively on the concessions. The 
emergency law repealed and modified important provisions of national Argentine law 
affecting the whole country. The most significant for the privatized utilities with foreign 
investors being (i) the abolishment of the currency board that had linked the Argentine Peso 
to the U.S. dollar to a 1:1 exchange resulting in a significant reduction in the value of the 
Peso; (ii) abolishment of the adjustment provisions of Tariffs in public service contracts 
leading to a ‘tariff freeze’ until a New Regulatory Framework had been set up; and (iii) 
authorization to the Executive branch of the Argentine Government to renegotiate all public 
service contracts. The law also prohibited any suspension or alterations of contractual 
obligations. In 2003 the Province of Buenos Aires enacted a New Regulatory Framework 
under which the renegotiations of the concession contracts were to take place. None of the 
Concessions were successfully renegotiated after several years of trying and were finally 
prematurely terminated by Argentine government in 2006.  
 
The investors brought claims of damages, arguing that Argentines response to the financial 
crisis and its failure to renegotiate the concessions had amounted to internationally wrongful 
acts under different BITs. The main points of issue were Argentines’ denial to adjust the tariff 
pursuant to the legal framework in order for the Concessionaire to recover all expenses and 
make a reasonable return, and that the NRF were regarded as less advantageous to the 
Concessionaire. Argentina rejected all claims in all three cases arguing that the emergency 
measures were of a general nature adopted in the context of the most systematic and serious 
crisis ever experienced by the country that affected all inhabitants of Argentine equally. 
Argentina also invoked the customary state of necessity defence arguing that the emergency 
measures had been necessary to in order for the economy to be reconstructed, and specific to 
these cases, to safeguard its populations fundamental human right to access affordable 
drinking water. The decisions on the merits were rendered between 2010 and 2016. In all 
three cases, Argentina was found to have frustrated the investors legitimate expectations 
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amounting to a violation Argentina’s obligation to guarantee to the investors’ “fair and 
equitable treatment.” All other claims were dismissed.  
 
 
6. 3 Did the Tribunal Accord Legal Impact to its Recognition of Argentina’s Human 
Rights Arguments? 
 
In all of the cases under analyses Argentine State advanced human rights arguments under the 
FET standard and the defence of necessity when it was found in breach of providing the 
investor with FET.  
 
The explanation for Argentina’s advancement of the human right to water under the FET 
standard is twofold. First of all, the FET standard usually focus on the ‘legitimate 
expectations’ of the investor’ which often encompass “all circumstances”. It thus allows 
foreign investors to rely on promises or guarantees that the State made to the investor 
anchored in the domestic framework and as such elevate domestic law to the international 
level.  
 
Simultaneously, it allows the State to invoke human rights concerns, facts and obligations that 
is argued should also inform investors’ expectations deriving from the domestic context on 
which he basis his claim. Another solution would be unfair.  This way the State can invoke 
human rights without encountering significant jurisdictional obstacles of the agreed applicable 
law or admissibility of human rights-based arguments as to the mandate of the Tribunal, but 
rather argue on an interpretive basis of harmonization and systemic integration of its parallel 
duties. Second of all, the reason why human right arguments was frequently argued under the 
FET and the customary law defence of necessity was presumably because the investor claim 
ultimately challenged the States regulations pursued with a human rights objective. 
Additionally, as BITs don’t accord right to States or obligations to investors, the status quo is 
that States always defend themselves in investor-State disputes with a ‘right to regulate for a  
‘public purpose.’ However, the content of this doctrine is highly unclear and disputed. It 
represents a business risk and public policy risk. What makes human right arguments different 
is that it is not first and foremost a question of the States right to regulate, but its duty to 
regulate vis-à-vis citizens most fundamental needs. A human rights duty has legal basis and is 
often enshrined in law and internationally recognized. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
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investor could have expected that the human right to water would be safeguarded if it was at 
risk. In disputes over water services this becomes even clearer a the very act of investing in 
public water utilities is in the furtherance of the human right to water. 
 
The following sections has divided the nature of Argentines arguments into four “groups” and 
outlines the response of the Argentine State to these arguments, but also some of Argentina’s 
arguments for the purpose of clarity. I will also in the identify relevant circumstances in the 
cases for the realization and recognition of the human right to water.  
 
6.3.1 The Measures to Safeguard the Human Right to Water was Within the Police Power of 
the State283  – no tension  
 
The Suez Tribunal agreed that Argentina’s obligation to the human right to water and its 
obligation to provide relief for the concessionaire were “not inconsistent, contradictory, or 
mutually exclusive.”284  The reason for this stance was that the Tribunal found ‘strong 
evidence’ for the availability of ‘alternative measures’ to restore the financial equilibrium of 
the CC when the emergency law was passed.285 However, in the award five years later the 
Tribunal acknowledged that “in the circumstances of the crisis” Argentina would face “a 
major problem deciding how to provide the Concessionaire with relief of its liquidity problem 
that was both immediate and would not provoke insurmountable public and political 
opposition.”286 As such it did appear to the Tribunal a significant tension. This had no impact 
at the time of the award as the decision on the merits had been rendered in 2010, five year 
prior to the Tribunals acknowledgement of tension. Both Argentina and the amicus had 
argued in the 2010 decision that Argentina’s human right to water obligations should inform 
the context, however the Tribunal in 2015 avoided this argument by allowing the generality of 
the crisis to inform the decision and thereby fails to identify the States competing obligations 
to prevent a situation that would lead a situation of political turmoil.  GC15 sets out a non-
derogable obligation on the State to “ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water, 
that is sufficient and safe for personal and domestic uses”287 The tribunal did not make a 
                                                        
283 Suez (ARB/03/19) Decision on Liability paras. 202, 203.; Impregilo v Argentine (ARB/07/17) Award (2011), 
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285 Ibid.  
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connection to the public ‘interests’ that might explain why it found it reasonable to expect a 
public outrage in case of significant tariff hikes, despite that its reasoning had been a direct 
response to Argentines argument that a tariff increase “would have been unrealistic and 
unfeasible in view of the high levels of poverty experienced by the Buenos Aires population at 
the time of the crisis”.288  
 
The Tribunal in the Impregilo case did not explicitly recognize Argentina’s human right 
obligations, but had ‘no doubt that drastic measures were required in the crisis for Argentina’s 
ability to provide the population with their fundamental needs to water and sewage 
services’.289 This can be taken as a recognition that of Argentina’s human rights defence with 
reference to the importance of its regulatory power to guarantee inhabitants the human right to 
water.”290 
 
The Tribunal in the Urbaser Case reasoning stands out compared to the two other cases it goes 
on to find that the investor had to rely on the Argentina’s constitutional and international 
delimitations of a fundamental character “such as the Governmental responsibilities under the 
federal constitution to ensure the populations health and access to water and to take all 
measures required to that effect.”291  
 
 
6.3.2 The Human Right to Water must Inform the Context292 
 
In the Suez case the Argument that had been advanced by Argentina was that it should be 
given a wider margin of discretion in this case due to the crisis, and that its human rights 
obligations should inform the context. Furthermore, the amicus submission had argued that 
Argentina’s obligation to provide a human right to water must provide ‘a rationale’ for the 
crisis measures when interpreting the BITs. However, the Tribunal seem to have understood 
this argument in a different way, as its response was that the right to water could not ‘trump’ 
other international obligations.  
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The Tribunal in the Urbaser case rejected that there was not a tension (as argued by the 
Claimant) because the water access “cannot be ensured otherwise than by failing to comply 
with the host State’s obligations toward the Concessionaire.”293 This conclusion was 
preconditioned by the finding that there were no alternative measures available, which the 
Tribunal in the Suez case had found that there was.  
 
In the Impregilo case Argentine argued that “on the one hand, obligations assumed by the 
Argentine Republic as regards to investments do not prevail over the obligations assumed in 
treaties on human rights[…]the obligations rising from the BIT must not be construed 
separately but in accordance with the rules on protection of human rights[…]treaties on 
human rights providing for the human right to water must be especially taken into account in 
this case.” 294 The Tribunal did not respond to the matter.  
 
6.3.3 The Human Right to Water Prevails (Suez and Urbaser)  
 
The Tribunal in the Suez case rejected that the ‘mere existence’ of a human right to water 
trumped other obligations nor that it ‘implicitly authorized’ Argentina to disregard its 
obligations to the investor.  The reference nevertheless confirms that the tribunal recognizes 
the HRW.  
 
Under the necessity defence, Argentina made a broad international constitutional argument to 
the general body of human rights law stating that “no obligation, either under domestic or 
international law[…]may override Argentina’s duty to guarantee the free and full exercise of 
the rights of all persons who are subject to its jurisdiction.”295 In furtherance of the hierarchal 
approach Argentina argued that a strict interpretation of the necessity defence would prevent 
Argentina from safeguarding “the life of a population” as such interpretation would lead to an 
“absurd situation.” 296 Argentina further pointed to the positive effects of its measures as they 
“prevented the human right to water from being adversely affected and, with it, the right to an 
adequate standard of living, food and housing” 297 and that the effect of raising the tariffs for 
the poor  “would have resulted in a massive violation of basic human rights”. 298 In contrast to 
                                                        
293 Urbaser and CABB v. Argentina (ARB/07/26) Award (2016), para. 720. 
294 Impregilo v Argentine (ARB/07/17) Award (2011), para. 230. 
295 Urbaser and CABB v. Argentina (ARB/07/26) Award (2016), para. 706. 
296 Ibid., para. 701. 
297 Ibid., para. 702. 
298 Ibid. 
 65 
the Suez case, the Urbaser tribunal clearly recognized Argentina’s Constitutional and 
International fundamental responsibility to ensure “the populations health and access to 
water” and that such obligations “must prevail” over the concession contract in times of 
financial crisis.299 The Tribunal also recognized the Argentina’s fundamental constitutional 
duties as invoked and prevailing the concession. One of the BITs in the Suez case were the 
same as in the Urbaser case.  
 
6.3.4 Only Way to Safeguard the Human Right to Water300 
 
The Tribunal in the Urbaser case accepted that Argentina had no other way to safeguard 
water access than to adopt the emergency measures and consequently could not provide 
immediate financial relief to the investors. It also noted that Argentina’s emergency measures 
had been ‘of reasonable proportions’.  
 
In Suez the Amicus argued that Argentina’s obligations to the human right to water had 
required adaptation of the emergency measures and that the measures fully conformed with 
human rights law to ensure ‘physical and economic access to water for the population’.301 
 
The Impregilo and Suez Tribunal recognized that water provision was an essential interest of 
the State and that there was a need to provide water services for millions of people in a time 
of crisis. However, the Suez Tribunal found that Argentina did not fulfil all the criteria’s set 
out in the codified customary on State Responsibility. Both the Suez and Impregilo case 
rejected Argentina state of necessity defence, finding that Argentina had significantly 
contributed to the crisis.  
 
It could be expected by the Suez Tribunal to give more consideration to the public interests at 
stake as it had recognized that the public would be impacted by the decision in its reasoning 
granting amicus the right to submissions:  
 
 “Those systems provide basic public services to millions of people and as a result may raise 
a variety of complex public and international law questions, including human rights 
considerations. Any decision rendered in this case, whether in favor of the Claimants or the 
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Respondent, has the potential to affect the operation of those systems and thereby the public 
they serve.»302 
 
As the citizens would be affected by “any” decisions, their concerns should have been taken 
into account in a better way by the Tribunal. A failure to do so risks violating their 
constitutional and international rights, based on ‘expectations’ founded on provincial law. The 
denial of access to documentation and hearings was a denial of their right to “full and equal 
access to information concerning water, water services and the environment, held by public 
authorities or third parties.” 303 
 
 
6.4 Alternative Measures and General Comment No. 15  
 
The existence of the alternative measures by the Suez Tribunal provided the basis for (i) the 
tribunals conclusion that Argentina had breached its FET obligation, (ii) that it had failed to 
satisfy the “only way” condition in the necessity defence (iii) the rational calculation of 
damages. However, it seems unlikely that the measures proposed measures could not have 
been carried out without compromising Argentina’s fundamental obligation to provide access 
to water for 9 million people in the midst of a financial crisis. 
 
The alternative measures suggested by the Suez Tribunal was the revision of AGBAs 
expansion goals, increasing the Tariffs at the rate of inflation, and granting the Claimants an 
immediate interest free loan of Argentine Peso (ARS) 132,6 million.304 The Tribunal made no 
further inquiry into the availability of funds for such a loan in the midst of the crisis. As to the 
Tariffs the Tribunal found that the Claimants request for an 87% increase was “unfeasible for 
both political and functional reasons,”305 but that at tariff increase at the rate of inflation of 
41% had been necessary to restore the financial equilibrium of the Claimant.306 The Tribunal 
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made no inquiry into the effects such tariff hikes would have on the people, despite 
Argentina’s and the amicus’ contention that it would make water unaffordable.  
 
The Tribunal in the Suez case nonetheless concluded that in order for the State to avoid 
liability the State should have granted the concessionaire higher tariffs. This is in stark 
contradiction to GC15 which sets out that “discriminatory or unaffordable increases in the 
price of water” would amount to a violation of the obligation to respect the right to water.307 
Had it been carried out it would have amounted to a violation of the States ‘core’ and non-
derogable obligation to the guarantee access to safe drinking water for all.  
 
Another alternative measure suggested by the Suez Tribunal was to revise the expansion goals 
of the concessionaire. However, his would not necessarily change the situation as Suez had 
failed to make investments and expansions since 1998. Suez was asking for a relief of 
commitments due to Argentina’s imposition of penalties for the concessions continuous 
breaches of contract.308  Relieving the water provider of legally established expansion goals 
appears to be a ‘retrogressive measure’ in relation to the ‘right to system of water supply and 
management that that provides equality’ which is in contradiction to the States “progressive” 
obligations under ICESCR Art. 2(1).309 Under GC15 a retrogressive action could amount to a 
violation of the right to water in the case of a “formal repeal or suspension of legislation 
necessary for the continued enjoyment of the right to water” that is “incompatible with the 
core obligations.”310 One ‘core’ and ‘non-derogable obligation’ set out under GC15 is to 
“ensure access to[…]water facilities and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially 
for disadvantaged or marginalized groups.”311 Investment commitments are commitments to 
expand water infrastructure and services to areas where it does not yet exist.312 The areas that 
                                                        
307 CESR, General Comment No. 15 (2002), para. 44 (a) 
308 Suez (ARB/03/19) Decision on Liability para. 196 and 208. . 
309309 ICESCR (1966), Art. 2(1); CESR, General Comment No. 15 (2002), paras. 10 and 19  
310 ICESCR (1966), Art. 2(1); CESR, General Comment No. 15 (2002), para. 19 (“There is a strong presumption 
that retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right to water are prohibited under the Covenant»); CESCR, 
General Comment No. 3 (1990), para. 9 (“any deliberately retrogressive measures…would require the most 
careful consideration and would need to be fully justified..”) 
311 CESR, General Comment No. 15 (2002), Para. 37(b) and 40 (italics added) (para. 40 sets out that “it should 
be stressed that a State party cannot justify its non-compliance with the core obligations set out in paragraph 37 
above, which are non-derogable”. Para. 37 sets out a number of “core obligations” which are of “immediate 
effect” including “(b) To ensure the right to access to water and water facilities and services on a non-
discriminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged or marginalized groups.”). ( 
312 Suez (ARB/03/19) Decision on Liability para. 148. (“AASA’s right to continue to[…]continue to operate the 
water and sewage system[…]were subject to various conditions concerning such matter as[…]achievement of 
investment commitments for improvement and expansion of the system”), para. 35 (“Concessionaire was 
 68 
don’t have infrastructure are typically areas where the most vulnerable populations live. 
Under GC15 ‘inappropriate resource allocation’ such as investments that ‘disproportionately 
favor water supply services…to a small, privileged fraction of the population’ would amount 
to “de facto discrimination.”313 ICESCR Art. 2(2) confirms that under-privileging a part of a 
population as to “social origin, property, birth or other status” would amount to 
discrimination. Discrimination in the undertaking of advancing the right to water is prohibited 
with “immediate effect.”314 As such, relieving Suez of its investment commitments would 
amount to a violation of Argentines ‘core and ‘non-derogable’ obligation to “ensure access” 
to “water facilities and services” on a “non-discriminatory basis.”315 
 
In contrast, the Tribunal in the Urbaser case found that Argentine had no alternative measures 
available during the time of the crisis to guarantee the continuation of the basic water 
supply.316 Therefore, the Tribunal dismissed all claims relating to the illegality of the 
emergency measures including claims that Argentine should have restored the financial 
equilibrium of the concession during the crisis. 
 
 6.5 Investor Misconduct  
 
 The Tribunals recognized that there was significant misconduct on part of the 
concessionaires in all the disputes under analysis. These violations led the Tribunal to dismiss 
the investors claim for protection under the BIT. The decision to terminate the concessions 
appeared to the Tribunal to have been done pursuant to the clauses provided in the 
Concession Contracts. The terminations had been legal which exempted the Tribunals 
jurisdiction on this issue. To reach this conclusion the Tribunal referenced to the misconduct 
of the concessionaires. The Tribunal in the Impregilo case referenced the Decree terminating 
the concession, which it found “mainly accurate”, and which concluded that the 
concessionaire had “failed to comply with nearly all the goals undertaken” causing 
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“irreparable[…]damage to the public interest”.317 The Tribunal also acknowledged that the 
“the drinking water samples show that the level of nitrate ion exceeds the parameters 
established in the Concession Contract” 318  and was “thus posing a constant threat to the life 
and health of the population, with no corrective measures being adopted in order to rectify the 
situation as soon as possible” 319 The Urbaser Tribunal referenced the evidence provided 
showing that the concessionary had failed to comply with the goals undertaken to secure 
sufficient funding leaving the undertaken goals “impossible to reach”, adding that “the failure 
to ensure compliance with the required Nitrate levels appears of some gravity, in light of the 
threat to the populations health and in particular small children and other vulnerable 
people”.320  In the Suez case, the concessionaire had unsuccessfully requested termination six 
months before Argentine abruptly cancelled the contract with allegations of high nitrate levels 
in the water. Tribunal stated that this “may” have been an unjustified pretext, but that there 
nonetheless “is evidence in the record that such high levels may have existed”.321 
Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the concessionaries request for termination may have 
been an important factor in the decision to cancel the contract as it left fear that the 
concessionaire would abruptly quit the country “leaving an unprepared Argentine government 
to provide a basic service to nearly ten million people in a large metropolitan area”.322 On the 
other hand, the Tribunal noted that the Argentine authorities refusal to accord the 
concessionaire with fair and equitable treatment had put the Claimants in the position where 
they “felt that had to give up the Concession”. 323 
 
6.5.1 Impact on the Calculation of Damages 
 
The Tribunal in the Suez case had concluded that the termination was lawful, but damages 
were calculated as if  ”the revenue stream would continue for another 21 years” because a 
legal termination “cannot exonerate it [Argentina] from its obligation to repair the 
consequences of its wrongful act”.324 
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Tribunal awarded full compensation for Impregilos’ investments of USD21,294 million. 
However, the Tribunal did not, as is custom, award Impregilo damages for its shares’ 
potential gains from the concession in a thirty-year perspective as there was not sufficient 
reason to believe that such gains would have been obtained even if Argentina’s measures had 
not taken place.325 It then found that the Impregilo and Argentine had a shared responsibility 
for the failure of the concession. 
 
Despite finding that Argentina had violated the FET standard, the Urbaser Tribunal did not 
award any damages because “the protection afforded by the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment cannot provide redress where the failure of the Concession is predominantly 
attributable to the failure on part of Claimants.” 326 
 
6.6 Regulatory Framework, Tariffs and General Comment No. 15  
 
The significance of the regulatory framework in the Suez case was that the economic 
equilibrium set out in the regulatory framework gave the concessionaire rights to make prices 
unaffordable: 
 
“the prices and tariff shall tend to reflect the economic cost of the water and wastewater 
service, including a margin of profit for the Concessionaire and incorporating all costs” and 
that “the amount resulting from the tariff charged to users shall permit the concessionaire, 
when operating effectively, to obtain sufficient income to cover the implicit costs of the 
operation, maintenance and expansion of the services provided”.327    
 
 
The Tribunal noted that the term “tend” was flexible but “[o]n the other hand, it is clear that 
the legal framework of the Concession sought to protect the Concessionaire from changes in 
the legal parity of the Argentine peso and from significant increase in costs.”328 Such a 
framework would amount to a violation of the right to water on behalf of the State as it allows 
increased costs to be placed on the citizens without any upper limit or possibility for the State 
to influence the development of prices, and often without transparency. GC15 sets out that the 
State must adopt a ‘national water strategy’ that ‘ensure that water is affordable to everyone’ 
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through ‘appropriate pricing policies’ based on the ‘principle of equity, whether privately or 
publicly provided’.329 However, the tariff regime that was negotiated gave the non-derogable 
right to affordable water a subordinate role to economic principles in behalf of the company.  
The GC15 would hence require a renegotiation of this contract as it tried under a new 
framework. Notably GC15 was issued in the same year as the renegotiation decree.  
 
The State’s wrongdoing in the Suez case included renegotiation of the concession contract 
under a new regulatory framework. GC15 sets out that the State must review existing 
legislation to ensure it is compatible with the obligations arising from the right to water, and 
“should be repealed, amended or changed if inconsistent with the Covenant [ICESCR Art. 
11(1) and Art. 12] requirements.”330 In light of the concern that decisions may lead to 
‘regulatory chills’ the outcome of the case could impact on the governments incentives to 
regulate in the interest of the people with regards to tariffs and changing the legislative 
framework in the future. This would be contradiction to the larger body of law surrounding 
and prevailing the tariff adjustment clause. 
 
The Tribunal in the Impregilo case found that Argentina’s actions had altered the economic 
equilibrium in the concession contract, and that its failure to restore a reasonable balance  
amounted to a violation of the FET standard vis-a-vis shareholder Impregilo. The ‘essential’ 
clause read as follows: 
 
“[t]he calculation of applicable tariffs […] shall be based on the general principle that tariffs 
shall cover all operating expenses, maintenance expenses and service amortization and 
provide a reasonable return on Concessionaire’s investment subject to efficient management 
and operation by the Concessionaire and strict compliance with the applicable service quality 
and expansion goals” 331 
 
Similarly to the tariff clause in the Suez case the financial balance and profit of the water 
utility ‘business’ is to be recovered by the users. In contrast to the tariff regime in the Suez 
case there is a balance in the economic equilibrium in this case as it was strictly conditioned 
by the concessionaries own compliance with the undertaken quality and expansion 
obligations. This ‘solution’ can have the effect of balancing out the costs for users, because 
the more users are connected, the more income is generated, and the higher quality of service, 
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the more willingness to pay. This scenario works best in the long run, as the economic 
equilibrium becomes vulnerable and might to be unsustainable if the expansion, profit, 
maintenance, and continued operation of the water service relies wholly on income from users 
from day one, particularly in a case such as this where the concession was in a poor area. 
Expansion of the infrastructure is, as mentioned, extremely costly and one of the main 
purposes of privatization in this case was to attract investments to realize expansion. The 
rationale behind thirty-year contracts is that it will take time to recover expenses and start 
making a profit. The concession had only operated for 16 months before it requested 
negotiations of economic equilibrium and had failed severely to perform. This was before the 
crisis.  
 
Additionally the Tribunal found that the concessionaire had failed to undertake most of the 
expansion goals.332 It had also failed severely to comply with quality goals:  
 
“the drinking water samples show that the level of nitrate ion exceeds the parameters 
established in the Concession Contract” 333 and was “thus posing a constant threat to the life 
and health of the population, with no corrective measures being adopted in order to rectify the 
situation as soon as possible.”334 
 
Argentina had an immediate obligation to “protect access to sufficient, safe and acceptable 
water”.335 The situation was also a severe violation of the citizens right to safe water. This 
was acknowledged by the Tribunal in the finding that the Termination of the CC has been 
legal. The factual circumstances imply that the concessionary was not in compliance with the 
criteria’s in the tariff clause, but rather, in serious nonconformity. However, the Tribunal 
ignores this by linking the essential bases for the economic equilibrium exclusively to the 
entitlements in the tariff clause and uses it as a yardstick to measure if Argentina has 
committed an internationally wrongful act. This is also after acknowledging that the 
concession was a “risk area with a poor population,”336  which was reference to business risk 
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The Tribunal in the Urbaser case resolved the tension between Argentines simultaneous 
treaty obligations with reference to clauses in the regulatory framework which set out to 
protect the rights of the users. These clauses implied awareness and acceptance of a 
fundamental human right. This indirectly bound the claimants in the region of the concession 
through their acceptance of the Regulatory Authority’s mandate to guarantee these rights, and 
had thus justified intervention prohibiting the cutting-off of non-paying users. 337 
 
Another interesting question that was raised in the claims was who was to bear the costs for 
Argentina’s emergency measures. The Claimants thus advanced the previous mentioned 
argument with direct reference to General Comment No. 15338 and Resolution 64/292339 
invoking Argentina’s obligation to “fulfil the burdens the rights to water entails, as Stated by 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.”340 The regulatory framework set 
out that the State should grand subsidies in times of emergency. This makes the framework in 
line with GC15 and also the non-derogable duties of the State. The Tribunal found that it had 
not been proven that Argentina had the means to subsidies available or how such policy 
would be implemented during the crisis. This invoked Argentina’s constitutional duty 
demanding Argentina to act as it did even if it implied an economic loss for the investor.  
  
The Urbaser Tribunal also assessed in detail the balance between the contractual equilibrium 
and business risk, which was at the heart of the disputes and finding of wrongdoing in the two 
above cases. The Tribunal came to a different conclusion on this point compared to the 
Impregilo case. In this case the Tribunal took account of the obligation of ‘strict compliance’ 
and also that the tariff clause was governed by Argentina’s constitution Art. 42 which set out 
a principle of “reasonable return” to protect the rights of users. In light of its failure to 
perform the Claimants economic situation was part of its business risk.341 Its failure to 
perform could thus not allow the concessionaries to take higher tariffs from users. The users 
are thus and the national framework appears in line with the States obligations.    
 
As to the failure of the renegotiation process Argentina held in the Impregilo case that 
the concessionaries request for a 93% rate increase was an unreasonable demand “that would 
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have negative effects for the customers whose economic interests required protection.”342 On 
this point, and after going through the elements in the renegotiation process which would put 
the concession under a new regulatory framework the Tribunal concludes, without regard for 
Argentina argument, that “it does not appear that Argentina took any measures to create for 
AGBA a reasonable basis for pursuing its tasks as a concessionaire which had been negatively 
affected by the emergency measures.”343 The act of renegotiation however appears as a 
measure taken to create a new basis for the economic equilibrium for the concessionaire as set 
out on the objectives of the New Regulatory Framework. With the Tribunals reasoning it 
appears that Argentina would have to renegotiate on the concessionaries terms, which could 
seriously impair the users and is a contradiction to its obligation to renegotiate contracts that 
do not protect the rights of users nor has any regard for the misconduct of the concessionaire.  
 
The Tribunal dismisses Impregilos’ claim that Argentina has violated its rights by suspending 
it from interrupting service to non-paying users during the crisis. However, this was not out of 
concern for the users, as Argentina has argued, but because it found that the Regulatory 
Authority had a mandate to suspend interruption in special cases.344 Thus, if such an 
exception clause did not exist, it seems like the Tribunal could find the suspension was a 
Sovereign act that possibly would have contributed to the finding that Argentina had violated 
the FET standard. This would of course violate the right to access to minimum amounts of 
water regardless of ability to pay. The regulatory framework that initially allowed the 
concessionaire to suspend service is not necessarily in contradiction to human rights 
framework because the human right to water does not give a right to free water. However, 
those who cannot pay, cannot be disconnected and have a right to a minimum amount of 
water for personal and domestic purposes to avoid disease and to survive. Disconnection of 
people who are unable to pay would amount to discrimination of the vulnerable. In a poor 
area, the regulatory framework should perhaps be amended to assure that non-connection is 
not used as a go-to, frequent solution to ‘encourage’ payments as it could leave people with 
little money for other things. In this case there had been very high non-collectability which 
might indicate that the tariffs were higher than people could afford. Thus, a violation of the 
human right to water on behalf of the state for not having a national water strategy that was in 
line with the ICESCR.  
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.  
6.7 The Impact of Human Right to Water Arguments  
The impact of the human right to water seemed insignificant in the Suez case as no tension 
was recognized when the decision on liability was made. In the Impregilo case the Tribunal 
did not explicitly recognize, however it did look at the investors misconduct, and not only the 
negative impacts on the investor in isolation. The Urbaser case stands out with significant 
weight. The Tribunals acceptance of both constitutional and international human rights 
concerns, facts and intensions progressively brides and harmonizes the relationship between 
different vital interests. One possible reason is of course that this decision was rendered after 
three UN Resolutions recognizing the human right to water in 2010 and 2015. The 
identification of the role of the regulatory framework in the case also shows the significance 
of making balanced tariff clauses and explicit references to user’s rights and interests, and 
also to retain regulatory flexibility in case of strictly interpreted FET clauses. The perhaps 
most stinking thing identified is the high level of investor misconduct and what seems 
unreasonable balancing of interests by the Suez and Impregilo tribunals with much disregard 
for the interests and rights of the users. The inconsistency in the cases confirm the concern 
over the systems unpredictability, and perhaps dependence on reasonable arbitrators and 
holistic views on the interaction between international, national, private and public law and 
interests.  The findings in this chapter will be further explained by detailed analysis of the 
tribunals interpretation and application of the FET standard.  
 
 
Chapter 7. Suez, Agues de Barcelona and Vivendi v Argentina  
 
“What would happen if water was left to the private markets?” 
-Pierre Thielbörger (2014) 
 
7.1 Summary of Case 
This was the largest concession in Latin America serving almost 10 million people between 
1993 to 2006. The first years it made substantial improvements, but the progress failed after 
1998, well before the financial crisis erupted.345  Five NGOs submitted a joint ‘Petition for 
Transparency and participation as amicus curie’ asserting that the case involved “matter of 
                                                        




basic interest and the fundamental rights if people living in the area affected by the dispute in 
the case”346 They requested access to the hearings of the case, documentation and to present 
legal documents as amicus curiae.347 They were denied access to hearings and documentation, 
but permitted to give a submission, making it the first amicus curie in the history of ICSID.348  
 
A unanimous Tribunal found that the Argentine State failed to provide fair and equitable 
treatment by its refusal to revise tariffs according to the legal framework, and for pursuing 
forced renegotiation contrary to the legal framework.349 The arbitrator appointed by 
Argentina, Prof. Pedro Nikken, agreed on the overall finding that Argentina had failed to 
provide the investors with FET, but disagreed with the Tribunals reasoning.350  
An unanimous Tribunal rejected Argentina’s necessity ‘defence, however Arbitrator Nikken 
again disagreed to the reason given by the Tribunal which had been that the “government 
policies and their shortcomings [since the 1980s – 2002] significantly contributed to the 
crisis”.351 The tribunal decided to calculate the damages in a separate award as it wanted 
assistance from an independent expert. In 2015 the Tribunal awarded the four corporations 
damages totaling USD405 million, plus interests.352 This makes it the largest award ever 
issued in an investment proceeding against Argentina. The annulment proceedings were 
unsuccessful.353  
 
7.2 Fair & Equitable Treatment – Tribunal interpretation and application   
7.2.1 Finding the Legal Rule  
The Tribunal was dealing with three FET clauses in three different BITs354 at the same time, 
and found that the ordinary meaning to be given to them were the identical in terms of 1) 
                                                        
346 Suez v Argentina (ARB/03/19) Order in response to amicus curie para. 1. 
347 Ibid. (friend of the court. A third-party without party-rights) 
348 Ibid., para. 19. 
349 Suez (ARB/03/19) Decision on Liability para. 247. 
350 Suez (ARB/03/19) Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken paras. 1-2  
351 Suez (ARB/03/19) Decision on Liability para. 264. 
352 Suez (ARB/03/19) Award. 
353 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A v. Argentine Republic (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/19) Decision on Annulment (5 May 2017).para. 435 
354 UK-Argentina BIT Art. 2(2) ("Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times be 
accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy protection and constant protection in the territory of the 
other Contracting Party…"); Spain-Argentina BIT Art. IV (1) ("Each Party shall guarantee in its territory fair 
and equitable treatment of investments made by investors of the other Party"); France-Argentina BIT Art. 3 and 
5 (1) (Article 3 "Each Contracting Party shall undertake to accord in its territory and maritime zone just and 
equitable treatment, in accordance with the principles of international law, to the investments of investors of the 
other Party and to ensure that the exercise of the right so granted is not impeded either de jure or de facto.". Art. 
5(1) "Investments made by investors of one Contracting Party shall be fully and completely protected and 
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ordinary meaning of “fair and equitable” and “just and equitable”; 2) they must be interpreted 
in light of ‘principles’ of international law355; and 3) that their object and purpose were to 
promote and protect investments.356 On a general note the Tribunal stressed the FET standard 
was ambiguous, flexible, fact specific, and adaptable, but also so painful to interpret that the 
previous case law on the Argentina crisis, as well as consideration of basic justice of equality 
before the law, and predictability in the development of investment law justified that “a 
tribunal should always consider heavily solutions established in a series of consistent 
cases”.357 The case law on the Argentine cases would dispute the alleged consistency.358 The 
general statement of the Tribunal is itself part of that inconsistency, and not just with regard 
to case laws’ subsidiary status as a legal source.359 Just consider the Tribunal in the Urbaser 
case on the comparability with the Impregilo case which was over the same concession:  
 
“[t]he Impregilo case does involve both AGBA and the Concession. This Tribunal, however 
is called to reach its own and independent judgement. The facts, evidence and legal argument 
brought before the Impregilo Tribunal were not the same as those submitted here”.360 
 
 
The opposing views confirms the inconsistency in investment arbitration. From this basis the 
Tribunal continues to interpret the FET standard with reference to the economic theorist Max 
Weber and several previous cases, but many of them not on Argentina. It finds that the FET 
standard protects the legitimate expectations of the investor resulting from “host government 
through its laws, regulations, declared policies, and statements[…]that influence initial 
                                                        
safeguarded in the territory and maritime zone of the other Contracting Party, in accordance with the principle of 
just and equitable treatment mentioned in article 3 of this Agreement.") 
355 Suez (ARB/03/19) Decision on Liability (Para. 183 “For purposes of these cases, the Tribunal finds that “fair 
and equitable” treatment and “just and equitable treatment” mean the same thing”; Para. 185. “Tribunal 
concludes that “in accordance with the principles of international law” means just what it says: that the tribunal 
is to interpret fair and equitable treatment under Article 3 of the Argentina-France BIT in accordance with all 
relevant sources of international law ; para. 186 “The Tribunal also concludes that the reference to “the 
principles of international” included in the Argentina-France BIT does not entail a different content in said treaty 
from that found in the other two BITs.”) 
356 Ibid.(Para. 188 “The fundamental purposes of investment treaties, as stated in their titles, are to promote and 
protect investments. Certainly, neither of those purposes could be achieved if treaties promised foreign investors 
treatment that was less than fair and less equitable”) 
357 Ibid., para. 189. 
358 The Argentina cases have been controversial, and some argue that it led to the legitimacy crisis in ICISD. 
Several tribunals have come to different conclusions e.g. on Argentina’s contribution to the financial crises. 
Several cases have been annulled.  
359 ICJ Statute (1946), Art. 38 (1) (d) (“The court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply d. subject to the provision of Art. 59, judicial decisions...as 
subsidiary means of interpretation”) 
360 Urbaser and CABB v. Argentina (ARB/07/26) Award (2016), Para. 101. 
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investment decisions.”361 Consequently, the Tribunal ends up with a FET standard that 
protects expectations from the time of the investment, and thus creates a version of a ‘freezing 
clause’ that requires the initial expectations to be upheld throughout the thirty-year 
concession contract. The Tribunal creates a basis for some flexibility to be taken into 
consideration when it sets out the objective components of the standard which were meant to 
ensure that the expectations are reasonable. The objective variables of the standard means that 
the expectations must  “be enforceable by law” and “must take into account all circumstances, 
including not only facts surrounding the investment, but also the political, socioeconomic, 
cultural and historical conditions prevailing in the host State”.362 Additionally, the investor 
“cannot fail to consider parameters such as business risk or industry’s regulation patterns”.363 
As such, being a concession in public water utilities which is part of a human rights 
framework that obligates all the State parties to the BITs in this case to progressively realize 
access to water for all,364 one might expect the content of the expectation at the time of the 
investment to encompass possible modifications and changes in pricing.  
 
In summary, the legitimate expectations, which determine the legality of the hosts States acts,  
must derive 1) at time of the investment 2) from sources enforceable by law 3) and  taking 
account of all circumstances. The expectations from these sources are violated under the FET 
standard when the State makes sudden change in law and regulations.  
 
7.2.2 The Legitimate Expectations Arising from The Regulatory Framework and The 
Concession Contract  
The Tribunal did acknowledge the States regulatory space and said that it had to “balance the 
legitimate and reasonable expectations of the Claimants with Argentina’s right to regulate the 
provision of a vital public service.”365 However, what the Tribunal meant, was that the 
Argentine States Sovereign right to regulate in times of crisis was confined within the 
provisions of the RF and CC which provided the mandate for the Regulatory Authority of the 
                                                        
361 Suez (ARB/03/19) Decision on Liability para. 222. 
362 Ibid., para. 229-230. 
363 Ibid., para. 229-230. 
364 Argentina-France BIT (1991) - France ratified ICESCR in 1980; Argentina-Spain BIT (1991) - Spain ratified 
the ICESCR in 1977; Argentina-UK BIT (1990) – UK ratified the ICESCR in 1976; General Comment No. 4: 
The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant) para. 8 (b)  The comment from 1991, before the 
investment in 1993 sets out that the right to safe drinking water is part of the right to an adequate standard of 
living. All the rights enshrined in the ICESCR are of a progressive nature as set out in its Art. 2 (1).  
365 Suez (ARB/03/19) Decision on Liability para. 236. 
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concession.366 Thus, the tribunal devoted its full attention to the stability of the concession 
contract and regulatory framework and holds that “the Claimants’ expectations that Argentina 
would respect the Concession Contract throughout the thirty-year life of the Concession was 
legitimate, reasonable, and justified.”367 .”368  Then the Tribunal has established a 
‘framework’ where the legitimate expectations of an investor are 1) established at the time of 
the investment (1993); 2) encompasses all the provisions of the Regulatory Framework and 
the Concession Contract; and 3) requires stability for 30 years. The paved the way for the 
Tribunal to find that the act of passing a law at the federal level, that denied the right to 
revision of tariffs (as set out in the CC) until the contract had been renegotiated and had 
negative effects on the concession, was outside of the mandate of the Regulatory Authority. 
Therefore, the Emergency Law of 2002 and resolution that required renegotiation amounted 
to a violation of Argentines duty to accord the corporations ‘fair and equitable treatment’. The 
Tribunals reasoning and conclusion were not impacted by the amicus argument that 
Argentina’s human rights obligations should provide a “rationale” for the crisis measures in 
“interpreting and applying the BITs”.369  
It seems then that the CC and RF functions like a “constitution” from where the 
legality of the States Emergency Measures is to be judged. Now, initially domestic contract 
provisions between a national company and a Provincial Authority is not international law 
protected under any of the Bilateral Investment Treaties, but the Tribunal has in quite a “goal 
oriented” way elevated these isolated expectations to the international level and giving them 
status as rights under international law, but with no regard to the laws prevailing the RF and 
CC in the domestic sphere or the rest of the objective criteria’s  set out when establishing the 
‘standard’ or doctrine of ‘legitimate expectations’.  
Another perhaps noteworthy observation is that there were several provisions in the 
regulatory framework that sought to protect the rights and interests of the citizens. For 
instance the Art. 5.3 of the CC which regulated the relationship between the RA and the 
concessionaire set out that the Regulatory Authority shall exercise its “police, regulatory, and 
control powers in a reasonable manner, considering especially the rights and interests of the 
                                                        
366 Ibid., para. 237. (“had the legitimate expectation that the Argentine authorities would exercise that regulatory 
authority and discretion within the rules of the detailed legal framework that Argentina had established for the 
Concession. But when faced with the crisis, Argentina refused to do this”) 
367 Ibid., para. 229-230. 
368 Ibid. 
369 Ibid., para. 256.  
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users.” 370 Or in the Basic Objectives of the RF which included  “3) to regulate and protect the 
rights, obligations and attributions of the users of the system[…]5) protect public health, 
water resources and the environment”.371 Its challenging to understand why the Tribunal did 
not pay attention to the objective of the CC and RF when interpreting it. It seems to have 
cherry-picked the provisions which provided protection of the Claimants economic interests, 
placed it under the FET standard and then interpreted it in the light of the purposes of the 
BITs, giving the CC and RF provisions the purpose of exclusively protecting the investor in 
the name of a screwed interpretation of “economic cooperation”.  Moreover, no reference has 
been made to the intentions of the State parties and if they possibly gave their consent to such 
interpretations of the FET standard. The disregard for customary rules of interpretation in 
most of the tribunals reasonings confirms the concerns expressed in the literature as regards to 
fragmentation and inconsistencies.  
 
Chapter 8. Impregilo S.p.A v. Argentina  
8.1 Summary of Case  
The claim was brought against Argentina in 2007 under the Argentine-Italy BIT (1990) by 
Impregilo, a company incorporated in Italy whom was a shareholder in a water and sewage 
concession in Buenos Aires, a high-risk region serving about 1.7 million people. There had 
been no other bidders for the concession. 16 months after takeover in 2000 the concession 
started running into trouble and failed, allegedly due to unforeseen high rates of non-
collectability of tariffs in the region, to access credit and the necessary funding it had 
guaranteed. When the crisis erupted AGBA was on the brink of collapse and demanded the 
reversal of the pesification law, adjustments to the expansion plan, and tariff increase. The 
government refused and held that it would be unreasonable to make adjustments as it would 
have negative effect on the consumers whose interests required protection.  
The termination of the Concession was found to be lawful.  
 
The Tribunal that the Argentine State had failed to provide ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
when it did not effectively restore the economic equilibrium of the contract after the 
emergency measures had further aggravated the economic situation for the concessionaries. A 
majority Tribunal rejected Argentina’s ‘State of Necessity’ defence under the ILC Draft 
                                                        
370 Ibid., para. 103.  
371 Ibid., para. 84.  
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Articles on State Responsibility Art. 25 para. 2 (b)372 finding that Argentina had significantly 
contributed to the financial crises due to long term failure to regulate the market.373  
 
The arbitrator appointed by Argentina, Professor of International Law Brigitte Stern was “not 
convinced that a substantial contribution of the Argentine authorities to the crisis has been 
satisfactorily proven by strong and convincing evidence”.374 She had also dissented on the 
majority conclusion that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over the case through the MFN 
clause.375 The Arbitrator appointed by Impregilo, US judge and lawyer Charles N. Brower, 
dissented on several points including the Tribunals rejection that expropriation had taken 
place, the rejection of several grounds on liability under the FET standard, and the 
methodology used for the calculation of damages.376 Annulment was dismissed.377  
 
 
8.2. Fair & Equitable Treatment – Tribunal interpretation and application   
8.2.1 Finding the Legal Rule  
 
The Argentina-Italy BIT was signed on May 22, 1990 and entered into force on 
October 14, 1993.378 
 
“Art. 2 Promotion and Protection of the Investment  
1. …  
2. Investments made by investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair 
and equitable treatment. ...” 379 
 
From those words the legality of the acts of Argentina during the financial crisis is to be 
evaluated. The Impregilo tribunal refers to two version of the FET standard found “in 
international law” with reference to two previous ICSID awards (both over US-Argentina 
BITs). However, it simply states that neither a minimum standard nor an autonomous 
                                                        
372 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, Art. 25 
373 Impregilo v Argentine (ARB/07/17) Award (2011), para. 358. 
374 Ibid., 360. 
375 Impregilo S.P.A. V. Argentine Republic (Icsid Case No. Arb/07/17) Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of 
Professor Brigitte Stern, (21 June 2011) 
376 Impregilo S.P.A. V. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17) Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Charles N. Brower (21 June 2011 ) 
377 IMPREGILO S.P.A. and ARGENTINE REPUBLIC (Applicant) (CSID Case No. ARB/07/17)Annulment 
Proceeding, ( 24 January 2014) 
378 Impregilo v Argentine (ARB/07/17) Award (2011), p. 3-6. (Translated to From Spanish and Italian to English 
in Award) 
379 Ibid. (Translated to From Spanish and Italian to English in Award) (italics added) 
 82 
standard will be decisive in the case and then moves on to define the content of the FET 
standard on its own.380 The tribunals finding of two standards in international law is in 
contrast to the Suez case finding of three standards. The tribunal considered that the words  
‘fair and equitable treatment’ gives reference to the investors ‘legitimate expectations’ simply 
because “the Tribunal considers that as it appears in the BIT, and in other similar BITs, is 
intended to give protection to the investors legitimate expectations.”381 Five paragraphs 
further down the Tribunal is less assertive but also ends its inquiry stating that “if fair and 
equitable treatment is indeed linked to the legitimate expectations, these have to be evaluated 
considering all circumstances.”382  
 
The Impregilo tribunal explicitly takes a stance against assigning FET the characteristics of a 
stabilization clause. It also explicitly recognizes that the investor cannot expect immutability 
of the legal framework but must expect changes in the socioeconomic universe “especially in 
times of crisis”.383 As such, the Tribunal has implicitly confirmed the States right to regulate, 
particularly in this case, but does not elaborate more on this point.  
 
With reference to ICSID case law and Christoph Schreuer, one of the most cited writers in 
investment law, the tribunals rule to differentiate between contractual rights, which falls 
outside the tribunals jurisdiction, and acts that can breach legitimate expectations is: 
 
“whether the State or its entities act as holder of sovereign power or as parties to a 
contract.”384 
 
Additionally to requiring it to be a Sovereign act that changes the legal framework, the 
standard requires the act to have some degree of unreasonableness and negative economic 
effect.385 Thus, since the emergency laws were acts of the legislative branch of government 
that changed the framework the rest of the conclusion relies upon how reasonable these 
modifications were vis-à-vis the expectations. The question of degree seems to rely on how 
far away the expectation were from what happened, so the reasonableness is very much 
reliant on the determination of the basis for the expectation and not necessary if the act was 
                                                        
380 Ibid., para. 289. 
381 Ibid., para. 285. 
382 Ibid., para. 290. 
383 Ibid., para. 291. 
384 Ibid., para. 296. 
385 Ibid., para. 291. 
 83 
reasonable in light of the intention, crisis or suffering of the population. Obviously, this can 
require the State, in order to avoid a corporate lawsuit, to avoid taking measures leading to 
unreasonable inaction from a human rights law perspective, such as allowing the continuation 
of the concession despite severe misconduct or the give the investors financial needs top 
priority. In the annulment proceeding Argentina argued that the Tribunal had contradicted 
itself when it had stated that the investor could not expect the state never to modify the 
framework and at the same time find that renegotiation was a violation of the FET.386 
 
In summary the legitimate expectations, which is to determine the legality of the States acts, 
must derive from 1) legal framework; 2) at the time of the investment; 3) that includes use of 
Sovereign powers; 3) and take account for natural changes in the legal framework. The 
expectations from these sources are violated under the FET standard when the State takes a 
measure that in violation of these expectations which are unreasonable and misuse of 
Sovereign power.   
 
8.2.2 The Legitimate Expectations Arising from The Regulatory Framework and The 
Concession Contract  
 
Despite referring to the relevancy of more than one circumstance the Tribunal does 
not mention any other specific source for the investor expectations other than the regulatory 
framework and concession contract and in it the first part of the tariff clause, as discussed 
above under 8.2.2. The Tribunal found that this clause in the ‘tariff regime’ in the Concession 
Contract ‘may’ to be regarded as an “essential basis for the concession which would have to 
be upheld even in a changing economic climate.”387 The tribunal finds that the negative 
effects of the emergency measures and the unfavorable new regulatory framework over which 
negotiations had additionally failed, further aggravated the economic situation of the 
concessionaire and amounted to a breach of the FET clause.388 The basis for the economic 
equilibrium no longer existed due to the devaluation of the peso which had damaging effect 
on the concessionaire, and therefore the Tribunal found that Argentina should have offered a 
“reasonable adjustment of its[the Concessionaire]obligations under the Concession 
Contract.”389  
                                                        
386 IMPREGILO S.P.A. and ARGENTINE REPUBLIC (Applicant) (CSID Case No. ARB/07/17)Annulment 
Proceeding, para. 60. 
387 Impregilo v Argentine (ARB/07/17) Award (2011), para. 324. 
388 Ibid., para. 330.  
389 Ibid., para. 325. 
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Thus, the Tribunal in its finding of a FET violation does not balance the investors 
duties/misconduct with this rights. However, The tribunal is not entirely consistent and 
ascribes part of the responsibility for the failure of the concession to the Impregilo 
 
“when assessing the situation as a whole, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot find it established with 
a sufficient degree of probability that the concession, even in the absence of acts violating the 
standard of fair and equitable treatment, would have been Profitable.” 390 
 
If the Tribunal had evaluated these facts prior to establishing a FET breach it might have 
influence the decision on liability. Nevertheless, the Tribunals limits the damages awarded to 
Impregilo due to the cited circumstance.  
 
Chapter 9 Urbaser and CABB v. Argentina  
9.1 Summary of case  
The claim was brought by three shareholders (hereafter joint Urbaser) under the Argentina-
Spain BIT (1991), for the same concession as in the Impregilo case. The Tribunal dismissed 
the comparability between the cases.391  The facts are the same as in the Impregilo case as to 
Urbasers’ blaming Argentina for its failure to obtain financing, failure to perform under the 
concession contract prior to the crisis and unforeseen low collectability rate. Urbaser argued 
that it had been hindered from cutting off non-paying users which increased non-
collectability. Urbaser argued that the economic measures were not part of its business risk, 
and that its failure to get sufficient funding was due to the authorities’ rejection to renegotiate 
the contractual equilibrium and grant tariff increases according to the regulatory framework. 
This was because tariffs had become the concessions only source of income. Argentina has 
denied tariff hike for the fear that it would have caused social distress and that the claimant 
could not expect tariff hikes due to a constitutional principle demanding balancing and 
safeguarding people’s right to health, safely and economy.392 Urbaser argued that Argentina 
had violated to the human right to water by failing to restore its contractual equilibrium. 
                                                        
390 Ibid., para. 376.  
391 Urbaser and CABB v. Argentina (ARB/07/26) Award (2016), Para. 101. 
392 Constitution of the Argentine Nation (revised version of 1994), (1994 (adopted 1 May, 1853)) Art. 42 (“The 
authorities shall provide for the protection of said rights, the education for consumption, the defense of 
competition against any kind of market distortions, the control of natural and legal monopolies, the control of 
quality and efficiency of public utilities, and the creation of consumer and user associations. Legislation shall 
establish efficient procedures for conflict prevention and settlement, as well as regulations for national public 
utilities”) 
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Argentina advanced a counterclaim holding that Urbaser had violated its human rights 
responsibilities. The counterclaim set a new ‘precedent’ for clarifying the requirements for 
counterclaims, but was eventually unsuccessful. A unanimous Tribunal found that Argentina 
had failed to provide Urbaser with ‘fair and equitable treatment’. A unanimous Tribunal 
accepted Argentina’s ‘State of Necessity’ defence under the ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility Art. 25 para. 2 (b)393 for the claimant’s failure to show a link of causality 
between the countries economic policies in the 1990s and “their necessary outcome the 





9.2 Fair & Equitable Treatment – Tribunal interpretation and application   
9.2.1 Finding the Legal Rule  
The FET standard in Art. X (1) of the Argentina-Spain BIT set out that  
 
“Each party shall guarantee in its territories fair and equitable treatment of investments made 
by investors of the other party.” 
 
Tribunal points out the extreme and legally unfounded positions of the parties’ with regard to 
the FET standards relationship with the international law.395 The Tribunal finds that the FET 
standard must be understood in light of the reference to ‘general principles of international 
law’ as set out in BITs ‘applicable law clause’ and that this is a reference to all of 
international law, as the ordinary meaning of the FET provision did not allow the finding of a 
reference to, nor the existence of,  a ‘minimum standard’ nor a ‘broader standard’.396 The 
Tribunal acknowledges the relevancy of Argentina’s question as to how the term ‘legitimate 
expectations’ is commuted into obligations and rights deriving from national law and reasons 
that 
“As the fair and equitable treatment standard is framed as an obligation of the host State, it 
creates rights for the investor upon which it can rely. These rights ensure the 
investor that it will not be faced with acts or omissions of the host State that are outside 
                                                        
393 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 25 
394 Urbaser and CABB v. Argentina (ARB/07/26) Award (2016), Para. 713. 
395 Ibid., para. 603. 
396 Ibid., paras. 610, 613. 
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the range of fair and equitable treatment[…]The next step is therefore to determine the scope 
of events, acts or omissions on part of the host State that[…]an investor[…]has to expect to be 
faced with. This is why the interpretation of this standard is usually focusing on the legitimate 
expectations of the investor, covering all acts and omissions of the host State that are 
embraced by the fair and equitable treatment standard.” 397 
 
This explanation offers a clarifying understanding of the role played by the term ‘legitimate 
expectations’ under the FET standard compared to the previous Tribunals. Additionally, it is 
set out as a negative standard determined by restrictions of what is ‘legitimate’.  
As to the objective components of the expectations the Tribunal sets out that they have 
to represent a source of law of a normative character, such as promises, guarantees that were 
decisive for the investor decision to invest and that the investor can expect the State to 
protect. This includes contractual commitments but “the mere focus on the investment 
contract is too narrow.” 398 The tribunal finds that the expectations of shareholders in the 
concession is not only founded in the contract, but are governed by the applicable law clause 
in the BIT, which includes reference to the laws of Argentina. As such, the tribunal widens 
the scope of the national law that the investor could ‘legitimately’ rely on to encompass also 
those laws that binds and governs the regulatory framework and is of a higher rang, such as 
international and constitutional law. Therefore the tribunal concludes that “the host State is 
legitimately expected to act in furtherance of rules of law of a fundamental character,”399 
which in this case “relates to the Government’s responsibilities under the Federal Constitution 
to ensure the population’s health and access to water and to take all measures required to that 
effect.”400 As such, in this case the State is not bound by the Regulatory Authority’s’ mandate 
under the regulatory framework to protect the communities and peoples interests of a 
fundamental character. Additionally, the tribunal creates a more flexible standard that takes 
account of changing circumstances that can trigger fundamental interests of any stakeholder, 
as this must have impacted on the expectations of the investor.  By looking at the facts of the 
case and States obligations, and by asking what the investor could expect seems like an 
effective tool to assure coherence of different legal norms that is relevant in the case.  
The relevant time for the expectations according to the tribunal must be evaluated in 
light of the actual state of the concession at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, and as such 
only those expectations that have remained from the time of the investment until the time of 
                                                        
397 Ibid., paras. 614 and 615. 
398 Ibid., paras. 618. 
399 Ibid., para. 621. 
400 Ibid., para. 622. 
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the alleged wrongdoing that is protected as “the investor’s protection for fair and equitable 
treatment cannot make contracts better than they were, nor can it restore rights or expectations 
that the investor has waived or lost due to its own negligence.” 401 As such, the standard does 
not, in this case, legitimate expectation is not necessarily measured from the time of the 
investment, but includes an amount of business risk and obligations on part of the investor.  
 
In summary, the legitimate expectations, which determine the legality of the hosts States acts,  
must derive from 1) promises or guarantees of a normative character 2) the actual state of the 
concession at the time of the alleged wrongful act 3), the fundamental legal rights and 
obligations of all stakeholders who might have an interest om the measure taken. The 
expectations from these sources are violated under the FET standard when the State measure 
of some importance violated norms or guarantees which has a negative effect on the investor 
of some gravity. 
 
9.2.2 The Legitimate Expectations Arising from The National and International Laws of the 
host State of a Fundamental Character  
 
The Tribunal separated the analysis of the different alleged wrongful act of the State at 
the time they occurred to measure them against the expectations the investor had at the 
relevant time under the FET standard. As mentioned above, the Tribunal dismissed that the 
emergency measures that froze the tariffs violated what the claimants could have expected.   
The protection of this universal basic human right constituted the framework for the 
expectation and with it the States duty and action to protect if need be. 402 As to the 
renegotiation under the new regulatory framework the Tribunal found that because the 
concessionaire had requested renegotiation, it had also accepted it, and could therefore not be 
heard that the new framework violated its ‘legitimate expectations’. This acceptance had also 
created a new legitimate expectation that was violated when Argentina had entertained the 
renegotiation process knowing that it would not be successful. This had amounted to 
unreasonable and non-transparent behavior on the part of Argentina that could not have been 
legitimately expected.  
 
                                                        
401 Ibid., para. 630. 
402 Ibid., para. 622. 
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The Urbaser Tribunal referenced the evidence provided showing that the concessionary had 
failed to comply with the goals undertaken to secure sufficient funding leaving the undertaken 
goals ‘impossible to reach’ adding that ‘the failure to ensure compliance with the required 
Nitrate levels appears of some gravity, in light of the threat to the populations health and in 
particular small children and other vulnerable people403   
 
Chapter 10.  Does the Regulatory Stability Expected undermine the 
States Regulatory Duty? 
 
The Tribunals in all the cases rejected the BITs reference to the customary minimum standard 
as well an ‘autonomous ‘standard and did not contribute to any clarification of these standards 
content nor their existence.  
 
In the Urbaser case the tribunal confirmed the possibility, as discussed under Chapter 44, of a 
change in customary law in relation to the FET standard and Argentina’s argument that the 
customary minimum standard should apply 
 
“Even if reliance on customary international law should prevail, it would still have to be 
examined whether this law has not been progressively developed towards a broader standard 
of investor protection, based on the legal practice and opinio juris related to 
international investment law”.404 
 
The arguments of the parties also demonstrated extreme positions in their interpretation of the 
FET standard in support of their positions. The Tribunals findings thus seem to be neutral 
stance and in line with the ordinary meaning of the FET clauses in light of their applicable 
law clauses and public international law. The standard applied in the cases had reference to 
the general body of international law. However, all the tribunals used ICSID case law, 
investment law scholars, economic scholars, and the ordinary meaning in light of the BITs 
object and purpose to interpret the standard. This gives it less of a character as a standard 
derived from general international law. However, if it is understood as giving reference to the 
body international law requiring interpretation in line with the principles and standards 
                                                        
403 Ibid., paras. 944 and 947. 
404 Ibid., 605. 
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derived therefrom is seems to enable a harmonizing character between the two areas of law. 
Nevertheless, the tribunals interpretation of the standards was different in number of ways, 
despite similar facts and “general” interpretations of the BIT clauses. Therefore, these cases 
do not provide much added clarity as to how this standard will be applied in the future.  
 
The Urbaser deliberation does however stand out as a transparent, well-crafted and 
persuasive interpretation of the standard. This is particularly from the point of view of 
harmonizing investment law with human rights law and avoiding outcomes that are overly 
restrictive on the States regulatory space in pursuit fundamental public rights and interests. 
The concern raised by States in this regard is evidenced in numerous new BITs and MITs 
with explicit references to the customary minimum standard and more specified FET clauses. 
The Urbaser case might be understood as a direct response to these concerns, perhaps 
particularly in light of the EUs scepticism toward the ISDS regime at the time of the 
judgement.  
 
For the interpretation of the FET standard to be harmonious with human right law its seems 
dependent on two things. First of all, the legitimate expectation must not be interpreted as 
“freezing” an expectation at the time of the investment regardless of any factual 
circumstances. Second of all, the expectations must clearly distinguish between contractual 
rights and protected ‘legitimate’ expectations. These two components are interconnected. This 
is because, if an expectation is based on a contract, the contract in practice becomes the legal 
right under the FET standard, and the contractual right is frozen in time on the paper it as 
written. Such a solution does not take account of ‘legitimate’ expectations, because it is not 
influenced by the actual world.  
 
All the Tribunals recognized that the FET clause did not freeze the legislative framework, 
however only the Urbaser tribunal applied this component. This enabled it to take account of 
circumstances at the time of the measure and identify what could not create expectations of 
protection and had to be expected in light of all circumstances, such as the investors own 
misconduct and the financial crisis. The two other tribunals state that the framework is not 
immutable, but then finds the contractual commitments immutable. They also state that they 
have to look at “all circumstances”, but merely looks at the contract. This leaves no room for 
evaluating the reasonableness of still expecting the contract to be a reasonable basis for the 
expectations. Had for instance the Impregilo tribunal, in the context of determining 
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‘legitimate’ expectations, looked at the letters the concessionaire had sent to the Province 
asking to adjust the tariff regime in it would have been harder to be convinced that the 
concessionaire would still expect that contract stay the same for 30 years. Hence, giving 
actual application to the components of the standard, which all the tribunals agree upon, will 
give a clearer distinction between contractual rights and protected expectations by taking into 
account a larger set of circumstances.  
 
The Urbaser Tribunal distinguished between different timing of the different acts of 
government vis-à-vis factual circumstances and then asked if it was legitimate to expect the 
States’ action. This led it to conclude that the investors could not legitimately expect the state 
to remain passive when their populations’ life, security and health were at stake. With this 
concern for the users of the water services is incorporated into the framework where the 
legitimate expectations derive. This outcome would not seemingly lead to a regulatory chill. 
However, the exceptional nature of the crisis also did two exceptional things which might 
have influenced the tribunals conclusion. First of all, it had invoked the States fundamental 
constitutional and international duties which legitimately prevailed most other concerns.  
 
Second of all, the tribunal had concluded that the measures were the only way for the State to 
act because of its financial crisis vis-à-vis the claimant’s request for economic relief. Thus, 
the combination of the invocation of fundamental duties and the lack of financial means did 
not make it hard to reject the claimants demand for financial support. The differentiation 
between the context of the crisis and the renegotiation period made this point clear. After the 
crisis there was no factual circumstances that would make it reasonable to for Argentina to act 
non-transparently. The legal rule adopted by the Tribunal does not seem to lead to a situation 
that is unpredictable for the investor. The essence is in the word ‘legitimate’.  
 
The Tribunal in the Impregilo case did not distinguish between different timing, but rather 
between the private or public character of the acts of Argentina. This left it searching for acts 
where public body other than the Regulatory Authority had taken measures that was outside 
of the police powers of the Regulatory Authority and if these acts had negatively affected a 
pre-established non-derogable expectation derived from the time of the investment. The Suez 
Tribunal similarly confines the States regulatory space within the mandate of the Regulatory 
Authority’s police powers. The consequence seems to be that there is no space for the State to 
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act in furtherance of its duties and rights if this would in any way imply breaching the 
contract which has been elevated and equated under the FET standard.  
The timing for the FET breach was pushed forward in each case corresponding it the 
assertiveness on the contracts stable nature. The Suez case determined that the breach had 
taken place with the passing of the emergency law on January 2002, while Urbaser 
distinguished between different act of government and corresponding expectations leading it 
to find a breach when Argentina acted in a non-transparent way during the renegotiations 
between 2003-2005. The Impregilo award is not explicit but it seems like breach occurred as 
Argentine failed to restore economic equilibrium, which pushed the time forward compared to 
Suez. The FET standard becomes unique in the Urbaser case because it allows invocation of 
both constitutional law and international law on behalf of the state.  
 
Chapter 11. Summary  
The system of investment law and arbitration can undermine human rights of citizens directly 
by not taking into account their right and interests in disputes that concerns them. Similarly, 
and in extension of this, is the disregard for facts, intentions behind measures and 
fundamental basic needs in conflict with the investor interests. The concerns relate to many  
 
The case law analysis has identified that if human rights law and investment law is to be 
found by a tribunal as compatible it would require them to consider the substantive side of the 
States human rights obligations, as well as consider the severity of the human rights situation 
to be able to identify interests protected by human right law and establish whether the States 
duty to act preventatively has been triggered or not 
 
From the perspective of human right to water the ultimate indicators of tension is the demand 
for absolute regulatory stability, the lack of concern for facts, the no concern for factual 
circumstances, the lack of concern for intent and isolated focus on effect on the investor, the 
uncertainty around inconsistent case law, States ability to contract away jurisdiction over key 
resources, lack of transparency and participation. 
 
The question of conflicts of law and resolution is an area of tension in arbitration tribunals as 
raise key concerns related to the tension between the states duty to regulate and the limitations 
placed on the regulatory space when entering treaties. This, of course is just the same with 
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any treaty but if the it seems little regard for the fact that human rights treaties are positive 
rights and not simply moral norms.  
 
The literature review revealed that the system of investment law and arbitration is full of 
controversy and unclarity. Despite this, it is still a go-to facility and renders cases with high 
frequency. The flexibility in anarchy, and the occasional “good award” should be used to 
progressively bridge more coherent bridges, as the Urbaser Tribunal set a precedent for. There 
are currently reforms undertaken in the system due to the critique rendered. I hope my 
contributing can be used as an example of the many pitfall, differences of approach’s that 
creates uncertainty, the possibilities within the framework and the demonstration of the wide 
discrepancy in two of these cases between the interests at stake and the interests addressed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
